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"Let there be progress, therefore; a widespread and eager progress in every century and epoch, both of individuals and of the general body, of every Christian and of the whole Church, a progress in intelligence, knowledge and wisdom, but always within their natural limits, and without sacrifice of the identity of Catholic teaching, feeling and opinion."—ST. VINCENT OF LERINS, *Commonit*, c. 6.

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AN EXAMINATION OF KANT'S FUNDAMENTAL TEACHINGS.*

I.

It may be said without fear of opposition that no one has done so much to color and shape the current of modern thought as Immanuel Kant. Men may not agree with him, at least as to the totality of his system; schools may rise up against his teaching as against one whose pernicious purpose was to shake the foundations of thought and overturn the intellectual achievements of the ages, and yet, unconsciously as unwillingly, many even of his opponents have been swayed to think and act as he thought and did. Vigorously opposed especially by the followers of Scholasticism, his influence has nevertheless been so widespread as to mould the philosophic thought of almost every other school. His philosophy laid the foundation for Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer in his own country, it was the inspiration of the Agnostic School from Hamilton to Spencer in England, and in France it gave birth to the Positivism of Comte and the neo-Criticism of Renouvier. Nor has the influence of Kantism been confined to the field of philosophy. It has made its way into theology, and is in reality

* The citations to the *Critique of Pure Reason* in this article are taken from the Berlin Academy Edition and from the English translation by Meiklejohn. In the references to the former the Roman numeral refers to the volume, the Arabic to the page. The references to Meiklejohn's translation are enclosed in brackets.

the basis of most of the contemporary religious thought now prevalent outside the Catholic Church.

It is the aim of the present paper to expose and examine the salient features of Kant's philosophy as expounded in the *Critique of Pure Reason.* His critical philosophy is divided into three distinct portions, the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical Reason, and the Critique of the Faculty of Judgment; but as Kant's philosophy stands or falls on the merits of the Critique of Pure Reason, which purports to be a critical examination of all our scientific knowledge, the doctrines of the second and third Critiques may be reckoned as of little value until the true worth of the first is clearly established.

In fact, Kant himself maintained that the whole purpose of philosophy was to give answer to three questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope for? And he further held that the answer to the first must precede and regulate the answers to the second and third.

It will, perhaps, be of service to a better understanding of our subject to observe that Kant's intellectual career is commonly divided into two periods, the pre-critical, extending from his twenty-third to his fifty-seventh year (from 1747 to 1781), and the critical, which embraces the remaining twenty-three years of his long, laborious life. At the age of sixteen he entered the University of Königsberg, where for six years he applied himself to the study of Wolff's philosophy and Newton's physics. On leaving the University he spent nine years as tutor in several distinguished families, and then returned to the University of Königsberg, where for fifteen years he filled the position of a licensed but unsalaried teacher. At the end of this period of service he was appointed to the chair of philosophy in the University of Königsberg, which he held until 1797, seven years before his death. The whole pre-critical period was a time of indefatigable labor, during which he profoundly considered all the great problems of the physical sciences and ethics. The philosophy taught by Kant during these years was the modified, dogmatic rationalism of Wolff

which he had learned as a student, and which at that time was the prevailing philosophy of Germany. In accordance with the principles of Wolff's philosophy he made reason the basis and test of all knowledge and metaphysical truth. Toward the end of the pre-critical period, however, Kant's faith in reason as the basis of all metaphysical knowledge began to weaken. Disturbed on the one hand by the apparent contradictions which he discovered in the physical sciences and by the scepticism of Hume on the other he determined to call to account all human experience. In this way he hoped to solve the difficulties thought to exist in the natural sciences and to place the truths of metaphysics on an unquestionable foundation. According to Kant's own words it was Hume who first interrupted his "dogmatic slumber, and gave his investigations in the field of speculative philosophy quite a new direction." [1] It may be well here to recall the chief features of Hume's philosophy.

Hume was a radical empiricist. For him experience was the one universal rule of philosophical procedure. He subjected all knowledge to the criticism of experience. He denied the substantiality of the mind holding that what we call mind is simply a "heap or collection of different perceptions united together by certain relations, and supposed, though falsely, to be endowed with simplicity and identity." [2] Locke had explained away everything except substance and the primary qualities of bodies. Berkley did away with these, and finally Hume completed the work of empiricism by denying even the substance of the mind, leaving only phenomena. Consistent with his doctrine regarding the mind, he explains causation as nothing more than a succession of relations between our ideas; and these relations, moreover, are not *a priori*, but gathered from experience. Repeated experience, argues Hume, shows us that whatever event has a beginning must have a cause, and hence *a posteriori* we conclude that an effect must

[1] *Proleg.* Berlin ed., IV., 260; Carus translation, 14.
[2] Cf. *Works*, I., 534.

have a cause. The dependence, therefore, between cause and effect is not ontological, but psychological—engendered in our mind by repeated experiences, and reason, accordingly, is unable to conclude *a priori* any necessary connection between cause and effect. Hume did not deny the utility of the concept of cause, but he did contend that it could not be conceived *a priori* by the reason, and that consequently, it possessed no *inner truth independent* of all experience in virtue of which its application could be extended beyond the objects of experience. In short, the principle of causation must not be extended beyond its source; if the concept of cause originates with experience, its use and application must be confined to the things of experience; but if it could be shown that it has its origin *a priori* in the reasoning faculty, then naturally it may be extended beyond the objects of sense.

Now it was this empirical solution of the principle of causality, as Kant tells us, which gave a new direction to his own speculations. It awoke in him the belief that the old *a priori* dogmatism of Wolff had put too much stress on the part played in our knowledge by the reason, while the empiricism of Hume had gone too far in the opposite direction, by making experience the sum total of all possible cognition. To get at the happy medium in which the truth was to be found he determined to subject all knowledge to a severe criticism in order thereby to ascertain how much of it is *a posteriori,* or from experience; how much *a priori,* or transcendental. Kant's philosophy is called a transcendental criticism precisely because it is an attempt to determine chiefly the *a priori* forms of all human knowledge.

Starting, then, to analyze the principle of causation, Kant tells us that he soon discovered "that the concept of the connection of cause and effect was by no means the only idea by which the undertaking thinks the connection of things *a priori,* but rather that metaphysics consists altogether of such connections." [3] By determining these *a priori concepts,* which he

[3] *Proleg.* l. c.

found to be many, he was able to bound and designate the entire scope and content of the field of metaphysics. For, according to Kant, metaphysical cognition is *a priori* knowledge coming from the pure understanding and pure reason, and hence by its very nature it abstracts from all empirical sources.[4] Its principles can never be derived from experience of any kind, whether internal or external, and this not only for that it deals solely with *a priori* concepts, but for the further reason that metaphysical knowledge must be universal and necessary—properties which experience is altogether impotent to supply. This brings out the Kantian distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge,—the former, being metaphysical, is characterized by universality and necessity, while the latter, as based on experience, is of a particular and contingent nature. Since then, we possess knowledge which is strictly necessary and universal, it is evident to the mind of Kant that our knowledge, in its entirety, is not confined within the borders of experience, as Hume would have us believe; but that, on the contrary, we can boast of real *a priori* cognition which constitutes the basis and principles of metaphysics. It must be noted, however, that Kant held that all our knowledge begins with experience. Here are his own words: "All our knowledge begins with experience, but that it all originates *from* experience by no means follows. It may well be that experience itself is made up of two elements: one received from impressions of sense; the other supplied by our faculty of knowledge on occasion of those impressions; an element added by the mind to the material furnished by the senses, an *a priori* element, an element independent not only of this or that experience, but of all experience and anterior to it." [5] It is also needful to bear in mind that Kant maintained that knowledge is the result of the action of the intellect on objects, and not vice versa. Rightly understood, this is correct, but not in the sense in which Kant meant it, as we shall see presently.

[4] *Proleg.* Berlin ed., IV., 266; Carus translation, 14.
[5] *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 27; (1).

In general Kant distinguishes a twofold object of cognition: phenomena and noumena. Phenomena are the appearances of things, the sensible representations of objects as pictured to us by and through our senses from the world of experience.[6] Noumena are the substantial realities underlying these sensible appearances, or phenomena, and are the proper objects of intellectual and rational activity. Phenomenon is the external appearance of the thing which strikes the senses, noumenon is the thing in itself (das Ding-an-sich). The subjective faculties by which we acquire knowledge are three, according to Kant: the senses, or sensibility (Sinnlichkeit), which is the power of receiving sense-impressions, or sensible representations of things, called phenomena or empirical "intuitions"; the understanding (Verstand), or faculty of knowing *a priori* by which the perceptions of phenomena are regulated and unified; and reason, or the reasoning faculty (Vernunft), by which the rules of the understanding are in turn regulated and reduced to unity.[7] The critical examination of the knowledge coming to or acquired by us through these three faculties is the burden of the *Critique of Pure Reason.*

In order, therefore, to determine with regard to each of these three faculties of knowledge what is *a priori,* or transcendental, Kant finds in each species of knowledge, sensible, intellectual, and rational two distinct elements: the one a material, the other a formal element. Hence all knowledge is made up of matter and form. The material element, that is, the matter or content of knowledge is that which comes from experience, the form or formal element is that by which knowledge is determined to this or that particular kind. The form is given *a priori,* independently of all experience, arising solely from the activity of the knowing faculty.[8] It is, indeed, the application of form to matter which alone makes experience possible.—So much as to the material and formal element of

[6] *Crit. of Pure Reason,* III., 50, 202, 212; (21, 156, 165).
[7] *Crit. of Pure Reason,* III., 237, 239; (189, 191).
[8] *Crit. of Pure Reason,* III., 100; (69).

knowledge in general. But each of the three kinds of knowledge just explained has its own particular matter and form. The matter or content of our sense-knowledge is phenomena, or sensible representations of things existing about us in the world of sense; the formal element consists of the two subjective forms of time and space which, anterior to all experience and innate in the sensitive faculties, are the conditions of all sensation.[9] The form, then, of sense-knowledge is *a priori* and altogether independent of anything objective in the realm of experience, moreover these subjective forms of time and space are imposed by the mind on the material element of sensation first, in order to render sense-perceptions possible, secondly in order to make them universal and necessary. All our sense-perceptions, therefore, according to Kant, are mere representations of phenomena—representations which manifest the qualities of things *not as they are in themselves,* but according to the *innate subjective forms* which precede all actual sensibility. These representations are consequently dependent on our sensitive faculties, and would be different if our faculties were otherwise constituted. The fact that all men with normal senses perceive the same phenomena in the same way comes not from the uniformity of the objects perceived, but rather from the uniformity in construction of our faculties.[10] Again, Kant would have it remembered that although these *a priori* forms of time and space make possible, regulate, and render universal and necessary all sense-perceptions they are not to be extended outside the narrow-range of the senses; they are meaningless beyond the data of sensation, *i. e.*, the appearances (Erscheinungen) of things.

We now come to the knowledge acquired through the understanding or faculty of judgment, with which, according to Kant, intellectual cognition really begins. The sense-representations (sense-intuitions) which result from the imposition of the *a priori* forms of space and time on sensible objects

[9] *Crit. of Pure Reason,* III., 50; (21).
[10] *Crit. of Pure Reason,* III., 55, 59, 65; (25, 59, 35).

constitute the material element of intellectual cognition.[11] The senses intuite, the understanding reflects on the intuitions of the senses, coördinates and reduces them to states of clear "consciousness" called judgments. Some of these judgments are contingent and particular, others, which only are proper objects of philosophical speculation are necessary and universal. Now as was the case with sense-knowledge, so here with judgment, universality and necessity must come *a priori*. Experience is at all times and in every instance unable to supply these attributes. That, then, which gives universality and necessity to our judgments exists *a priori* in the intellect, or faculty of understanding, and is imposed by the intellect on sense-intuitions in a similar manner and for a similar purpose as the *a priori* forms of space and time are imposed on phenomena. This formal element of intellectual cognition comprises twelve *forms* termed *categories*.[12] Although undetermined in regard to any object these *categories* or functions of judgment are calculated not only to give universality and necessity to the operations of the understanding but to guide and direct it in the formation of all its judgments. Being purely logical functions inherent in the nature of the understanding prior to all experience, they do not afford the least concept of an object aside from experience. They require sensible perceptions as a basis and are useless for any other application, hence they do not extend our knowledge, they relate only to the appearances of things, and tell nothing about the noumenal reality underlying those appearances.[13]

Attention must be called right here to Kant's well known *synthetic a priori* judgments. It is well to remember that his division of judgments comprises two classes: *a priori* and *a posteriori* judgments, and secondly those called *analytic* and *synthetic*. As already said, by *a priori* judgments he means those which are formed from pure concepts without any reference to or dependence on experience, except in a material way,

[11] *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 93; (62).
[12] *Crit. of Pure Reason*, l. c.
[13] *Crit. of Pure Reason*, l. c.

inasmuch as the notion of the subject and predicate may come from experience; for example, "every change must have a cause." Thus the fact of a change we know from experience, but that it is *always* and *necessarily* connected with a cause we know only *a priori*. When the connection of subject and predicate is known only from experience, and is by consequence contingent and particular, as, "John runs," the judgment is *a posteriori*.[14] An *analytic* judgment is one in which the predicate is contained in the notion of the subject, as, for example, the judgment, "all bodies are extended." In judgments of this kind the predicate adds nothing to the notion of the subject; it only explains by a different term what is expressed by the subject, hence there is an identity of meaning between subject and predicate as can be seen from a simple analysis of each. But the reverse is the case with synthetic judgments. In a synthetic judgment the predicate not being contained in the notion of the subject, but, on the contrary, being something which no analysis of the subject could have ever disclosed, really augments the significance of the latter. Thus "all bodies have weight" is a synthetic judgment, because "weight" is an idea not essentially bound up with the idea of body; it is a contingent addition to the notion of body.[15] So far it would appear that Kant and the Aristotelian philosophers are on a common footing; but Kant goes on to observe that while all analytic judgments are *a priori*, synthetic judgments are sometimes *a priori*, sometimes *a posteriori*. A judgment is "synthetic a posteriori" when the predicate is not contained in the subject, and when the nexus between the two, as being the result of experience, is not necessary but contingent as in the proposition, "John Smith is wealthy."

A judgment is "synthetic a priori" when its predicate is not contained in the notion of the subject but when the nexus, or linking together of subject and predicate is necessary and universal, for example, "every effect has a cause." Judgments

[14] *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 28; (2).
[15] *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 33; (7).

of this kind are *synthetic,* says Kant, because the putting-together (synthesis) of the subject and predicate is the result of experience,—the ideas of cause and effect are not connected because the idea of one is contained in that of the other (as the Aristotelians would contend), but only because it is a matter of experience that the one is not found without the other. Further, this sort of judgment is *a priori,* because the universality and necessity which it involves must come from the understanding independently of experience. Experience can give us only contingent and particular data, and hence the universality and necessity which characterize "synthetic a priori" judgments can have no other source than the pure concepts of the understanding. Therefore, the proposition, "every effect has a cause," expresses a judgment which is, first "synthetic," because the subject and predicate are not intrinsically connected, but associated through experience, secondly, it is "a priori," because the pure concepts of the understanding have endowed it with universality and necessity.[16]

Nearly all the judgments which constitute science are "synthetic a priori," according to Kant. These only, in fact, enter into true science, because in these alone is found the two-fold element requisite for scientific judgment: they are necessary and universal in their application and veracity; and moreover they are of such a nature as to add to knowledge, since the predicate always enlarges upon the notion of the subject. Analytic judgments, he holds, do not contribute anything to knowledge, although they may give clarity to our conceptions. And "synthetic a posteriori" judgments have no scientific value, since, depending as they do entirely on experience, they are always particular and contingent. To the "synthetic a priori" judgments only, then, can we have recourse for knowledge truly scientific, but even these are useless beyond the realm of phenomena; of noumena, or things in themselves they tell us absolutely nothing.[17]

[16] *Crit. of Pure Reason,* III., 35; (8).
[17] *Crit. of Pure Reason,* III, 207, 231; (161, 183).

The third part of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is occupied with an examination of the reason, or reasoning faculty together with the knowledge acquired through it. It is the office of the reason to order and reduce to unity the concepts and judgments of the understanding, which concepts and judgments make up its material element, or content. The form of rational cognition Kant places in three "norms," or "ideas" existing *a priori* in the mind. The function of "ideas" in the rational faculty is similar to that of space and time in sensation, and that of the categories in the understanding.[18] These three ideas correspond to the three distinct operations which Kant finds in the reasoning faculty: the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive operations of reason. The categorical reasoning is based on the category of substance and accident, and leads to a certain absolute subject that can not be predicated of any other, and this constitutes the "ego" or psychological idea. Hypothetical reasoning, resting on the category of cause and effect, leads to the notion of the dependence of all singular, contingent things upon a certain totality, and this is the idea of the world, or cosmological idea. Disjunctive reasoning rests on the category of mutual action and leads to the idea of absolute unity of all realities, which is the idea of God, or Theological idea. These three ideas as being made up of purely subjective elements, do not represent anything outside the mind "in rerum natura." Their one purpose being to direct the mind in its reasonings, they constitute a *norm* by which the mind is able to know and to reason within the limits of experience; but by them or through them nothing can be known, nothing concluded beyond the range of phenomena.[19] There is in us, Kant admits, a certain necessary and natural inclination to extend the use of these ideas beyond the realm of sense to noumena, or things in themselves, and this especially with respect to the nature of the human soul, the world and God. But this tendency of our nature, he urges, is an error, a vain

[18] *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 239, 241; (191, 192, 193).
[19] *Proleg.* Berlin ed., IV., 350 ff.; Carus trans., 120 ff.

delusion. These ideas are to regulate our knowledge of the things of experience, and nothing more.[20] By yielding to our natural desire to extend them beyond the sphere of experience we fall into lamentable errors: false conclusions about the nature of the soul, cosmological contradictions, and sophistic Theological reasonings. The office, therefore, of true philosophy, in Kant's opinion, is to discover these errors of pure reason and help us to guard against them.[21] Truly the natural impulse of the human mind to pass from phenomena to noumena, from the things that appear to the things that are is inevitable and unchangeable like nature itself, and yet Kant warns us that this is a vain and deceptive tendency. Nature and reason, it would seem, are false and erroneous at the root.

One must not, however, infer from the foregoing reasoning that Kant did not believe in a spiritual soul in man, the reality of the material universe, and the existence of God. He simply maintains that we cannot prove these things, that as realities they must ever remain unknown to us. His position in this regard is a logical conclusion from his principles already explained. The senses are the source and ground-work of all our knowledge, and they do not go beyond phenomena. So far as the objective reality of things is concerned understanding and reason are unable to go beyond the data of sensation. That there is within us a spiritual principle destined by force of its nature to survive the body, that the world about us is no sham but a substantial enduring reality, that there is outside and above this perishable world a supreme, though, as far as speculation can tell us, an unknowable God,—all this, Kant concedes, we may believe and hope but can never prove. In view of such doctrines it is not difficult to account for the origin and progress of Agnosticism, and of the general sceptical tenor of modern philosophic thought.

From this exposition of Kant's philosophy his aim throughout the *Critique of Pure Reason* is clearly manifest. His chief

[20] *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 349 ; (288).
[21] *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 234 ff.; (186 ff.)

purpose, as against Hume, is to vindicate "certain ingredients of our knowledge as belonging to mind, not to matter; to the subject not to the object; to the understanding, not to sensation; to the *a priori,* not to experience." [22] And yet, as has been repeatedly observed, Kant insists that these *a priori* concepts, or laws of thought must never be applied outside the limits of sensuous experience. All our objective knowledge is phenomenal. The nature of objects considered in themselves, and without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility, is quite unknown and unknowable. Our own peculiar mode of perceiving appearances is all we can lay claim to. Noumena really exist and sustain the phenomena that appear, but that is all we know about them.[23]

To the question, now, which Kant set out to answer, whether, namely, we can know anything of those things which transcend experience; and, by consequence, whether metaphysics is at all possible, he would reply: *a*) We can know nothing beyond the phenomena of objects that come under the senses; as to noumena, or the realities underlying phenomena they cannot be denied to exist, but what they are we can never know; *b*) Metaphysics, as a science, is altogether impossible, and this for the reason that is consists of transcendental truths to which pure reason is unable to atain; *c*) that we should attribute objective validity to our transcendental concepts is a natural delusion.

Stopping with the conclusions thus reached in the *Critique of Pure Reason,* Kant's doctrine evidently leads to open scepticism, so far at least as respects the world of reality. He undertook a thorough criticism of all human knowledge, not to destroy or tear down, but with the sole purpose of determining what part or how much of it had a footing *a priori,* and he ended by overthrowing, (to his own satisfaction, at least), the possibility of proving by speculative reasoning those truths which, before his time, had been considered most sacred in the range of knowledge. But Kant did not consider his

[22] Max Müller, *Science of Thought,* p. 144.
[23] *Crit. of Pure Reason,* III., 65; (35).

efforts destructive, especially when regarded in the light of their final issue,—far less did he wish to be stigmatized as a sceptic in any sense. What he took away from the realm of speculative knowledge he endeavored to restore to humanity by having recourse to Practical Reason.[24] The truths which, through his *Critique of Pure Reason,* he had deprived of all metaphysical moorings he tries in the *Critique of Practical Reason* to establish and vindicate on an unshakable moral foundation. The dictates of the Practical Reason, and the force of the inner written moral law are a supreme criterion of truth unto every man. By his practical reason man discovers this moral law, and, by consequence, his personal moral obligation. To this moral obligation, called the "Categorical Imperative," three truths, says Kant, are necessarily presupposed: the liberty of the human will, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of God. Without liberty there would be no merit in harkening to the voice of conscience; without another, enduring life, law would be lacking its proper sanction; without God virtue would frequently go unrewarded, vice unpunished.[25] Hence these truths are, as it were, preambles to the moral law, they pave the way for it, they solidify its basis, they contribute to render it that unquestionable bulwark of truth and sanction which make its dictates supreme, imperative, and universal. It is in virtue of this employment of the practical side of pure reason, that Kant says we may have *belief* in the supersensible. While insisting on the rights of both faith and knowledge, Kant's critical philosophy carefully distinguishes the domain of the one from that of the other; knowledge rules in the phenomenal order, but faith in the noumenal.

II.

So much for a general exposition of the teachings found in the *Critique of Pure Reason.* With these salient features of

[24] *Crit. of Practical Reason,* Berlin ed., v., 132; Abbott trans., 229.
[25] *Crit. of Prac. Reason,* l. c.

Kantian philosophy before us, it will be interesting to apply to his teaching something of his own method, by subjecting it to the test of criticism. For this purpose it is not at all necessary to go minutely into detail, nor to give here all the arguments, multitudinous as they are, which can be leveled against the seer of Königsberg. It will be sufficient to hold up to light a number of his most glaring fallacies.

In the first place it would seem that any philosophy, any teaching, which rejects truths at all times and by all men admitted as certain and above question; and which, on the contrary, holds as true that which all are by nature wont to deny, —it would seem, that such a philosophy can not be other than false and absurd. And yet, as has been seen, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is a philosophy of this kind. All its conclusions, as he elaborated them, are opposed to the common consent of those, who preceded its author, as well as to the natural judgments and dictates of the human mind. Almost on its face, therefore, it merits rejection. For what can be more preposterous than to believe that all the sages of antiquity, and all the men of genius and learning down to the time of Kant were deceived and in error regarding the most fundamental and momentous questions of philosophic thought and investigation. "It is human to err," but human nature is not intrinsically erroneous. Moreover, the very things which Kant denies, as well as those which he affirms fare thus at his hands without sufficient reason; his contentions are wanting a foundation; his position has not a valid justification even in itself,—it is arbitrary and gratuitous, as will become clearer as we proceed.

Kant is quite Aristotelian in his teaching that the senses are the gate-ways of our knowledge. That there is nothing in the mind which is not in some way the result of sensation is axiomatic in the schools of sound philosophy. Human knowledge always begins with the senses. He is also quite right in allowing that the mind is able to generalize upon the contingent impressions received from particular sensible objects, thereby constructing the universal and necessary laws which govern

science and lift it above the variable, singular objects with which it deals, but in assigning the source whence springs the possibility of such universality and necessity, Kant goes woefully astray. Unlike the Aristotelian he does not find running through the various classes of singular things which confront the senses a universality of nature and necessity of law which, as a foundation, give to science its invaluable character and unfailing sanction; but on the contrary, seeing in the objective world only particularity and contingency, he has recourse to a vain, groundless fancy as the basis of science. Knowing that science must be universal and necessary in its certainty, and being unable to discover these qualities *a posteriori* he concludes by an astonishing assumption that they exist as forms *a priori* in the mind. Space and time, then, which are the two great regulating conditions of all phenomena, and which impose on the raw material, so to say, of our knowledge the qualities that constitute science, have no existence outside the mind except as applied to objects by the mind, but are *innate, a priori* mental forms. Not only is proof for this contention wanting, but the reasons which led Kant to it, seem so devoid of common sense, let alone sound reason, that one is tempted to disregard his whole system as an idle dream—a novel fiction unworthy of serious consideration.

A similar treatment merit Kant's "synthetic a priori" judgments, on which he seeks to base his whole system, and, in fact, all scientific knowledge. Thought and real knowledge, according to Kant, begin with judgment; but only that kind of judgment can be the source of knowledge truly scientific which at once amplifies and extends our knowledge, while imparting to it stability and certainty. This is effected, he teaches, only by "synthetic a priori" judgments: analytic judgments remaining within their own concepts do not enlarge upon the notions they express, while *a posteriori* judgments are unable to furnish the qualities which science must possess. So he reasons. By arbitrarily restricting the meaning which has always attached to analytic judgments he formulates a new class calculated to answer his purpose. In the first place he

jumps at the conclusion that an analytic judgment is one whose predicate is convertible with its subject and thus lacks the quality of expansion; and secondly, being unable to discover any intrinsic, necessary and universal connection between subject and predicate in those synthetic judgments which are otherwise suited for science, he gratuitously conceives that these qualities of universality and necessity are supplied extrinsically by *a priori* mental forms. His whole difficulty arises from a misconception of analytic judgments. For this kind of judgments it is only necessary that by a simple analysis of subject and predicate these be found to agree or disagree, and that either because the predicate is contained in the notion of the subject, (as when we say, "man is an animal"); or because in our analysis of the terms we discover a reason why one should be attributed to the other. Thus in the proposition, "the world has been created by God," we find on analysing the subject "world" that its contingent and limited nature are inexplicable apart from the predicate, "has been created by God." Synthetic judgments on the other hand are those in which, from a simple analysis of the terms, we could never associate them, their connection or bond of union being entirely a matter of experience. Given this correct understanding of analytic and synthetic judgments there is clearly no room or demand for Kant's middle class, "synthetic a priori." The example he gives to prove their existence, only serves to show his own erroneous notion of the two classes admitted by the followers of Aristotle. For example in the proposition, $7 + 5 = 12$, Kant insists that no analysis of $7 + 5$ will ever convey the idea of 12. It is only, he says, by a blind synthesis, born *a priori* in the mind which gives a necessary and unfailing connection between $7 + 5$ and 12. Here it is plain that Kant was more concerned with the symbols than with the concepts expressed by them. If we consider the ideas conveyed by these sensible signs $7 + 5$ and 12, the position of Kant seems absurd. In fact the very contrary of his conclusion is the obvious one. For the most simple analysis of the meaning of 7 and 5, makes it clear to the mind that, when united, they

signify a quantity or number identical with that expressed by the symbol 12. The sensible figures count for nothing aside from the meaning they give out, and hence when one clearly understands the idea which 7 and 5 expresses, and the further idea expressed by the figure 12, he at once perceives they are one and the same,—that one is entirely contained in the other. Therefore the association of the concepts expressed by 7 + 5 and 12 results from their respectively intrinsic significance, and not from any extrinsic or *a priori* source.[26] If, however, we attend, as perhaps Kant did, to the mere symbols 7 + 5 and 12, then we may say that it is only by experience and custom that the particular arbitrary signs of 7 and 5 have come to be associated with the other arbitrary sign 12. Kant's mistake evidently comes from confounding the origin of the association of the sensible signs with that of the ideas. Because of the identity of their meaning the ideas have a necessary connection, while the symbols expressing them are associated only because common consent of men has decided that the arbitrary signs 7 and 5 should when united, signify or be equal to the arbitrary sign 12.

Take another example. In the proposition, "this world had a beginning," Kant admits that there is a necessary connection between the predicate, "had a beginning," and the subject, "world"; but as usual he assigns no reason for it other than an innate mental necessity whereby we are compelled, so to say, to connect these two concepts. And since his position is purely gratuitous, it may be denied without hesitation. Truly there is between the extremes of this proposition, that is, between the concepts expressed by the extremes, a necessary connection, and that for reasons intrinsically objective. On looking into the nature, structure, and composition of the object which is called "world," it is at once evident to the mind that such a contingent, changing thing as it is, could not have been from everlasting, independent and self-existing, and therefore must have "had a beginning." In short, we analyze the subject and

[26] Cf. Hugon, *Logic*, 126.

predicate and find an intrinsic bond between them. The same process discloses the intimate connection between subject and predicate in that other Kantian example, "everything that happens has a cause." This is an abstract and general proposition, and yet the very fact that a thing happens, or takes place, or is effected or produced (these are all synonymous terms), is a proof that it has not within itself the reason of its existence and is, therefore, dependent on something else for its existence, which is to say it had a cause.[27] The very examples, then, which Kant adduces to illustrate his "synthetic a priori" judgments prove, (since they are in fact illustrations of analytic judgments), that his new division or class of judgments is without a basis or a reason, and consequently that his fanciful theory about *a priori* forms which he calls categories, excogitated to supply extrinsically an element which these judgments already possess by force of their own intrinsic nature, falls useless to the ground. He is wrong in his outset, and the farther he proceds and the more hypotheses he formulates, the more does he become involved in error. That this is the case is proved by a glance at his theory respecting the knowledge acquired by the reasoning faculty.

In treating of the elements of rational cognition, Kant, as has been shown, asserts the existence of three kinds of ideas innate in the mind: the idea of self or the "ego," the idea of the world, and the idea of God. Nobody wishes to deny that we have in our minds these distinct ideas; but that, as Kant maintains, they exist *a priori* in the mind, and are for the sole purpose of regulating our empirical knowledge is one more mere assertion unsupported by the slightest argument. Equally groundless is the supposition that these transcendental ideas, not born of any experience, can not, nevertheless, be extended beyond the range of our experience. As to their existence, we are told they are entirely independent of experience, but for their use and application they are strictly limited to experience. And why? What is the reason for

[27] Cf. Hugon, *l. c.*

this? Granted that all our knowledge begins with the senses, why can not the mind afterwards transcend sensibility? Why must it forever remain within the limits prescribed by the data of sensation? That it must be so is Kant's supposition. This is his starting point. This it is which has given rise to the *a priori* fabrications which he places in sensibility, understanding, and reason respectively. And hence all subsequent explanations of his *a priori* forms, Kant treats in a manner suited to fit in with his philosophical dream. He started with a dream, and he is determined to dream on, logically indeed, to the end. It seems beside his purpose to take into account any difficulties that may be connected with his system,—none, in fact appear to have occurred to him.

Again it may be asked why there is within us, engraven in our nature, a mighty and irresistible desire to extend these transcendental ideas of God and the human soul beyond the order of phenomena? Can it be that a desire so universal and constant is but a vain delusion? Is human nature in error, and Kant alone right? Hardly so. At least a sound mind is rather inclined to accept the uniform and noble promptings of man's nature in preference to the wild assertions of one troubled brain. But the extension of these ideas outside the pale of experience leads to a whole network of antinomies the most lamentable, Kant replies. As a mattter of fact these antinomies or contradictions are born of Kant's own ignorance, or self-deception. An equivocation lies at the bottom of all his antitheses. For example "The world has, as to time and space, a beginning," *i. e.*, it is limited (thesis)—"The world is, as to time and space, infinite," *i. e.*, it is limitless (antithesis).[28] His conclusion here is that the world is at once finite and infinite. It is finite, since it had a beginning in time and space; it is infinite because it may be indefinitely extended and prolonged as to space and time. In the first place, one is a little confused to hear Kant talking this way in regard to space and time, since he holds as one of the corner-stones of

[28] *Proleg.*, Berlin ed., IV., 338; Carus trans., 104.

his system that space and time are mere mental forms having no objective existence or essence, save as applied here and now by this or that mind. However, granting the objectivity of space and time for his present purpose, we may solve his difficulty by simply calling attention to the fact that there is not the remotest contradiction between a thing having a beginning and no end. Because a being is to endure indefinitely is in no wise repugnant to its having had a beginning. The human soul has been created in time, and yet, being spiritual in nature, is destined never to have an end. Where is the antinomy here? Kant has confused the idea of indefiniteness with that of infinity. Infinity means limitlessness, without beginning or end, and hence there is but one infinite being, God.

Another example of Kantian contradiction: "There are in the World Causes through Liberty" "There is no Liberty, but all is Nature." [29] Let it be noted, before examining this antinomy, that one of the chief ends of Kant's labors was to defend human liberty for on it he grounded the great Moral Law, the certainty of whose existence was to his mind beyond all question. In liberty he found the sanction of this law, and consequently man's freedom and responsibility were as certain to him as the existence of the phenomenal order. What, then, does he mean by "nature"? Nature in itself is not necessarily opposed to liberty. It is natural to man to be free. It is a part of his nature. Therefore by "nature," which would be opposed to liberty, he perhaps wishes us to understand necessity. Yes, this is his meaning, for he says, "All the actions of rational beings, so far as they occur in any experience, are subject to the *necessity* of nature; but the same actions as regards merely the rational subject and its faculty of acting according to mere reason, are free." [30] And by "necessity of nature" he means the determinibility of every event in the world of sense according to constant laws, that is, a reference to cause in experience." Now, if this

[29] *Proleg.*, *l. c.*
[30] *Proleg.*, Berlin ed., IV., 343 ff., Carus trans., 111 ff.

means anything, it is that every sensible event (effect) has a cause, "nature" demands so much; and this law of nature remains whether the actions of rational creatures proceed from free choice or election, or whether they are elicited without regard to reason. "In both cases the effects are connected (with their causes) according to constant laws," and this is what is meant by natural necessity. But when acts proceed from rational agents according to reason, that is, freely, "it is reason," says Kant, "which is the cause of these laws of nature (he would better have said, reason fulfills or verifies these laws of nature), and (is) therefore free." If the actions are not determined by reason, "they are subjected to the empirical laws of sensibility, but reason is not therefore determined by the sensibility, and hence is free in this case too." Now the upshot of all this abtruse, unwarranted line of reasoning is that freedom and necessity both exist in the world, each controlling its own domain unimpeded by the other. Where, then, is the real antinomy or contradiction? According to Kant's own reasoning it does not exist.

Kant has generally been given the credit of having conceived and elaborated an eminently architectonic system of philosophy in so far, at least, as he brought it to completion. The novelty and logic of his reasoning have been highly extolled. To the majority of the present age, who follow him so blindly and are so imbued with his principles that all their thoughts and writings are Kantian in tone and tendency, it does not seem to occur even in the remotest way that his wonderful system is, in its very outset, based on a contradiction. His initial principle is that no truth, no knowledge is to be admitted until the faculties by which it is acquired have been rigorously subjected to criticism. Be it remembered that criticism of all our knowledge and knowing faculties is the key-stone in his imposing philosophical edifice. And of "pure reason" this is especially to be observed.[31] This is the whole aim of the *Critique of Pure Reason,* and yet he undertakes his gigan-

[31] *Crit. of Pure Reason,* IV., 9, (XV).

tic task presupposing (as he must if he would ever make a start) the unquestioned veracity of the dictates of that pure reason. It is plain then, that he wishes to except from criticism or question the reliability of the initial dictates of pure reason. So much he needed as a basis on which to start, and with this beginning, gratuitous or contradictory (it is one or the other), he proceeds to establish the following conclusion: "Pure reason divested of all experience has no objective validity." Again we look in vain for proof of this conclusion; but passing over here as elsewhere the absence of proof as one of Kant's habitual failings we may presume to ask if he really means that at least this his dogmatic conclusion has any objective worth? Is it merely something subjective appealing to Kant alone (if so it need not cause anybody else any concern), or is it something objectively true so that every one who wishes to be on the side of truth must hold it. The latter is obviously the sense in which it is to be understood. There is then something, even according to Kant, which has objective truth, independently of Kant or any other particular individual. This is consoling; but how does Kant arrive at the conclusion that *this his fundamental conclusion* is objectively certain? How can he prove, or whence does he infer it? Surely not through the senses, since they are impotent to deal with the problems of pure reason. This conclusion must, then, be an inference of pure reason independently of the senses and experience; but the conclusion itself is that "pure reason divested of experience has no objective validity"; that is, pure reason at once has and has not objective validity.[32] Here we have Kant in an open contradiction. He would reply, perhaps, that pure reason has objective validity in drawing the conclusion that "pure reason divested of experience has no objective validity," but in every other deduction pure reason has no objective worth apart from experience. Some such reasoning as this would suit his purpose and help him out of the difficulty, and without doubt he would have called it into

[32] Cf. *Lepidi Elem. Phil. Christ.*, 1, 350.

service, had he been pushed to the wall. But although it is the only refuge to shield him from an overwhelming difficulty, it is absurdly groundless. If pure reason, independent of experience, has any objective meaning or validity in one instance, why not in every instance? If it can deduce a valid conclusion in one case, why not in all similar cases? If it is freed from the trammels of sense as to one of its inferences, why should it be enslaved by them in all others? As much warrant, (to say the least), have we to assert the objectivity of all our ideas, as Kant has to assert the objectivity of one and deny it of all the rest.

Kant's main purpose in writing his philosophy was, as has been explained, to refute the scepticism of Hume and place human science on a firm and unshakable basis. His was to be the only really sound and uncontrovertible system so far excogitated by the mind of man; it was to be logical, unanswerable, high above all errors. Lofty his aim and tireless was his toil,—fascinating, to himself at least, the prospect of his life's work. With all his acuteness he did not even suspect the presence of the baneful errors that pervade his entire system of thought; he would have revolted at the suspicion that the outcome of his philosophy was also scepticism, yet so it is. Scepticism is inevitable to any one who pursues to their logical conclusions the fundamental teachings of Kant. Thus did Fichte, one of Kant's most illustrious disciples, end in idealism, (another name for scepticism), as a result of pushing to their logical conclusion the principles of his master.

To be convinced that the philosophy of Kant terminates inevitably in scepticism, we need but call to mind and examine carefully the purport of his final, grand conclusion,—that, namely, we can know nothing beyond phenomena. He insists throughout that all our knowledge is necessarily restricted to the *sensibilia* which strike our senses in one way or another; of things in themselves—the realities underlying phenomena, we can know absolutely nothing. Phenomena alone have for us objective validity. This is Kant's reiterated plain teaching. But if we are true to his principles and examine closely the

process of reasoning by which he established this conclusion, it falls out logically that even our knowledge of phenomena is not at all objective,—that phenomena like noumena, so far as we can know, at any rate, have no objective worth. This is not to imply that Kant makes the whole external world a sham. No, he does not wish to be considered an idealist, for he holds fast to the reality of phenomena. He persists in declaring that the world of sense is an objective reality, and that it is supported by an underlying reality called noumena; but just as he denies the possibility of our knowing anything of the real nature of noumena, so, conformable to his principles, ought he to hold that we do not and can not know anything of phenomena beyond the mere fact of their existence. All our sense-impressions, he tells us, are nothing but appearances of things which represent objects not as they are in themselves, but according to the mode in which these objects affect our senses. But these appearances, or representations, as we have seen, are dependent on the senses, that is, on the *a priori* forms of sensibility, so that, were our innate subjective forms, which precede and regulate all sense-perceptions, otherwise constructed, these appearances would be other than they are.[33] Given different subjective faculties, or, which amounts to the same, different *a priori* forms which alone render experience possible, and all our sense-perceptions would be entirely different. From this it is evident that, according to Kant, our perception of phenomena does not depend on the phenomena perceived, but rather on the *a priori* sense-forms which make possible and govern all empirical knowledge. Hence it follows that all the knowledge which Kant allows as possible to us—a knowledge of phenomena—is entirely subjective, dependent on forms innate in the mind anterior to all experience, and whether the phenomena rendered possible by these forms really exist outside the mind as pictured by the same forms in the mind, we do not and can not know. Indeed how could we know, if Kant's reasoning is correct? What means of assurance have we that

[33] *Crit. of Pure Reason*, III., 55, 59, 65; (25, 59, 35).

the color or shape existing outside our senses is in exact conformity with our subjective impression of it, since the latter is entirely regulated by and dependent on something subjective and altogether distinct from the object perceived? And if this is so, what is to save us from pure subjectivism and pure idealism? What is there to stay our despair of ever attaining any knowledge really and truly objective, of phenomena as well as noumena? Thus in harmony with Kant's principles, we should hold that all the knowledge which is possible to man is bound up within him as in a prison, and whether or not there is anything outside him in the objective world corresponding to the impressions and perceptions which he possesses, he is unable to say, he can not know. As to a uniformity of perception among all men,—the fact that all, or the majority perceive the same objects in the same way counts for nothing as to the objectivity of their perceptions, so long as these perceptions, or the forms which mould and make them are products *a priori* of subjective faculties. To be consistent it should be said that the uniformity of perception is due to the uniformity of subjective forms, and not to the uniformity of the phenomena existing without. But more, Kant's principles must logically deny to him all knowledge of a uniformity of perception among all men. How could he know this except by allowing the objective testimony of his senses, which, as has been shown, are entirely enslaved by *a priori* forms.[34] All this is especially emphasized against Kant, if we further remember that for him formal truth does not consist in a conformity between the mind and the object it perceives, but in conformity of our knowledge with itself.[35]

To eschew these undesirable yet necessary inferences from his principles and teaching, perhaps Kant would explain that, since the inborn subjective forms of time and space are for the sole purpose of determining, regulating, and making possible all our sense-impressions, they have been preordained and predestined, (by whom he knows not), to be of that exact and

[34] Cf. Farges, *Études Philosophiques*, 4c ed., v., 72.
[35] Cf. Farges, l. c.

peculiar nature and construction which makes their own creations (sense-perceptions) exactly correspond to the sensible objects (phenomena) existing in the objective world. In other words, the forms of all sense-perceptions exist *a priori,* independently of every thing objective, these forms create and shape and make possible all our phenomenal impressions (sense-impressions), and yet there is perfect agreement between these subjective impressions and the objective phenomena they represent because the latter have been *made to order* to fit the former, (or vice versa, if this would please Kant better). In the light of this novel solution of the problem one can see, (though he may fail to understand), how our sense-perceptions have objective validity, and how consequently, we may have a true knowledge of sensible objects or phenomena. This is a noble specimen of the efficiency of a lively imagination; it shows something of the power and unlimited extent which that faculty is capable of when unrestrained and allowed to roam at large. At any rate it would follow, according to Kant's own teaching, as we see, that, since our sense-perceptions depend on our sensitive faculties, if these faculties were to undergo a change, or had been otherwise constructed, the phenomena of the world would likewise have to be changed and rearranged in order to have perfect harmony between them and our perception of them.

This sounds rather specious even if ludicrous; hence for the sake of a little further argument, let it be entertained as the only means of explaining Kant's position. Immediately arises the question, on what grounds does Kant deny the possibility of our acquiring a knowledge of noumena, or things in themselves? If there is something really existing objectively in the phenomenal world which to a nicety corresponds to the *a priori, made-to-order* types existing in our sensibility, and concerning which we have real knowledge (the only knowledge we do or can have, according to Kant), on what authority, and by what rules of consistency does Kant maintain that of noumena, or things in themselves we can not have real knowledge—a knowledge equal in certainty and completeness to that which

we possess of phenomena? Have we not as much reason to believe that the knowledge which our intelligence frames of the objects of pure understanding is as real and as comprehensive as that given us by the *a priori* forms of sensibility? Is that object which we see and understand by the mind less real, less understood than that perceived by the senses according to forms, not dependent on the sensible object perceived, but innate in sensibility? Over and over again Kant admits that the human mind in its sweep ranges far beyond the things of sense and experience,—he repeatedly owns, as has been observed before, that there is engraven "in our nature an indomitable tendency, an insatiable desire to probe beyond the world of time and space to learn what lies hidden in that vast unknown"; and yet withal he makes bold to aver that this expense of power, these wild desires that haunt the human heart are fruitless and vain, impossible of even the faintest satisfaction. Here as elsewhere he does not prove his claim, he merely states it, as consistent with his initial principle that the senses are the measure of our knowledge, and so leaves it unsubstantiated by a single further argument. That noumena exist is certain, but what they are must forever remain a mystery to us. His words are: "Objects of the understanding are granted, but with the inculcation of this rule which admits no exception: that we neither know or can know anything at all definite of these pure objects of the understanding, because our pure concepts of the understanding as well as our pure intuitions extend to nothing but objects of possible experience, consequently to mere things of sense, and as soon as we leave this sphere these concepts retain no meaning whatever." [36]

From this, and from his entire line of reasoning, it is evident that Kant's mistake is that of one who, having begun with a false principle and laid a faulty foundation, does not discover his error, but continues on adding mistake to mistake and fallacy to fallacy unmindful and regardless of the accumulation of absurdities to which his method leads. For this reason, if

[36] *Proleg.*, Berlin ed., IV., 315; Carus trans. 76.

for no other, one is as justified in denying his groundless assertions, as Kant himself is in affirming them. If Kant admits, (as he must do, if we have any knowledge at all really objective), that the *a priori* forms of sensibility have been made to order to represent exactly the phenomena of the world, or, if he prefer it, that the phenomena of the world have been made in order to correspond with the *a priori* forms of our senses, he should, to be consistent, allow that noumena likewise have been made to correspond to the pure concepts of our understanding, so that there is an exact agreement between noumena and the concepts which exist *a priori* concerning them. And further, it being once admitted that our pure concepts have objective validity, whether by reasons of made-to-order concepts, or made-to-order noumena, there remains no reason why the intellect may not rise above all things connected with the sensible order and take hold on objects purely spiritual, thus enriching its store of knowledge from the spirit-world as well as from the realm of sensibility.

It comes to this, then, to be at all in harmony with the principles of Kant's philosophy, we must hold, either that all knowledge truly objective, whether phenomenal or noumenal, is impossible of attainment, contenting ourselves with pure subjectivity and scepticism, or that the knowledge which we possess, or seem to possess of noumena is as real and as full of meaning as that which we have of phenomena. We have both or neither, we may not consistently admit the one and reject the other. Let the disciple of Kant think the matter over and make his choice.

CHAS. J. CALLAN, O. P.

THE PASSING OF MEDIEVALISM.

When the figure of Martin Luther shall have receded to its proper historical perspective, along with those of Arius and Nestorius, and be regarded as the originator of a religious following since become fairly innocuous, then will be written an adequate and serene account of the passing of Medievalism and of its chief incident, the Reformation. Until then it seems hopeless—at least so far as the reception of such a book is in question—because it is idle to expect the average reader to wish for a perfectly fair account in his present bigoted state of mind.

However, even now progress is being made, even if slowly. The old authors of the Froude type are pretty generally discredited by non-Catholics, whilst Catholics themselves are rather diffident of such well-meaning but unwise defenders as Darras. So that, though we cannot even yet, after almost four hundred years, boast of an adequate and perfectly just history of that momentous change in human affairs, nevertheless we are really beginning to judge of it more calmly and, as a consequence, beginning to see beneath the crust of religious strife down to the great causes underlying it. The following is a rough sketch of what seem to the writer as those causes. In proportion as all of us look at the event in such a light, just so much, we believe, will the way be gradually prepared for a real history of the Reformation.

Now, whilst considering the causes usually given credit for the Reformation, it has ever increasingly seemed to the present writer that sufficient influence has not been assigned to three which are herein insisted upn as paramount, almost adequate. The average, practically all, historians harp upon the religious side of the movement, whereas, this on closer investigation will, we predict, become more and more regarded as secondary and a result of others far deeper and vaster. Such a view is slowly, but surely gaining ground amongst Protestants themselves.

For instance, Arthur Cushman M'Giffert in his very suggestive "Protestant Thought before Kant" boldly says that "The Protestant Reformation was not exclusively nor even chiefly a religious movement" (p. 9).

What was it then at bottom? It was a general movement away from medieval civilization because of the very exhaustion of medieval civilization, accentuated by both racial and political dissatisfaction with the established order. This, we prophesy, will become the ultimate verdict of history, when religious bitterness will have become sufficiently softened to consider this momentous revolution with unbiased calm.

I.

The Racial Cause.

What strikes the student of medieval civilization at the very start is the obvious fact that it was overwhelmingly Latin in spirit, form and expression.

The very head, the leadership, the supreme apex of that civilization personified in the Papacy was Latin, Roman. Now and then a German or Frenchman (one Englishman) filled Peter's chair. But they are, at least during the best of the Middle Ages from Hildebrand to Boniface VIII, only exceptions. Italy ruled then in the Church as she did in the arts and letters later on.

The legislation of the Church was Latin, distinctly Roman. Her Canon Law, as it came forth from the decretals of Popes and perfected under the master hand of Gratian, was based upon the old Roman Civil Law very largely as to judicial spirit and more so in expression. The Teutonic or Anglo-Saxon or Frankish "Custom" made practically no impression, rather was itself impressed.

The religious ceremonial of the peoples in that strange medley of young races was Latin in speech. Allowing for some exceptional rite here and there in Spain or the Slavic lands, Mass and the other services of the Church were carried on in the

tongue of the Cæsars from Benevento to the British isles. It was the only common tongue for Europe. It was the language of law courts even in such far lands as England until what seems quite a recent date.

In view of this, it is hardly necessary to add that the Latins furnished chiefly the brains and the inspiration for pretty much every great movement.

The great Doctors and Fathers of the Church, who represent all that was most brilliant in intellectual life, were Latin from Jerome and Augustine to Aquinas, with an occasional "barbarian" like Alexander of Hales thrown in to relieve the monotony. The Universities, wherein centred far more than even now the highest and broadest learning, were practically all situated in Latin lands. Up to the beginning of the fourteenth century there was not a single university situated in a non-Latin Country, Oxford and Cambridge excepted, and even these being modelled on and mere imitators of Paris and Bologna. The Rhine and Danube were, in this sense, the boundaries of science.

So with all the great movements of the age. The great religious Orders are founded by Latins—Benedict, Augustine, Dominic, Francis. It is another Latin, Hildebrand, who stamps his genius upon the Church's policy for over two hundred years. A Latin kindles the fires of the Crusades and the bulk of the fighters come from a Latin land, France.

Everywhere, in all directions it is Latin genius directing, forming, developing, controlling. The reason is evident. The present European races were in an inchoate state. Above all is this true of non-Latin nations. Germany, with all its imperial honors, was a confused conglomeration of independent fiefs. There was no such thing as English consciousness until the time of Edward I. The rest of Europe was even worse off. Therefore, whilst even France and Italy, above all Spain, were not yet the complete national entities they afterwards became, still their very heritage of Latin blood and civilization easily gave them, at least the two former, a tremendous prestige over the rest of the civilized world. The German Emperors might

make or unmake Popes, and Richard Plantagenet be the hero of medieval warfare; but Germany and England and every other non-Latin race, because of their very undeveloped racial consciousness, accepted unreservedly the lead of the mentally superior Latin in religion, science, ritual and general policy. Cæsar's ghost dominated Europe in the thirteenth century as much as he did when alive B. C.

Now, then, here is the point. So long as the non-Latin peoples were racially undeveloped, little or no antagonism was to be expected towards the Church so intensely Latin in character. True, there was always an undercurrent of hostility, chiefly in England, but not enough to break out openly. But once these young Teutonic races became fused into complete political entities, conscious of their strength, of ideals racially distinct, possessed of a language of their own in which these ideals were being expressed, no longer timidly looking to old Rome for either ideas or systems of polity, but rather developing their own innate strength, it is only natural to expect that a change in their relations with Rome was inevitable. A complete break such as really came was not inevitable. But some change and a vast change was inevitable.

It is with this broad fact in mind that a student can understand the purely non-Latin character of the Reformation, something which at the very start makes him sweep aside, as merely secondary, its religious character. If it were religious, why did it not permeate Latin peoples also; for surely discontent because of the abuses in the Church was as great in Italy as in Germany and minds in France were as active in the quest of knowledge as they were in England.

Against this will be urged that Ireland, Belgium and Southern Germany remained faithful to the Church, whilst the Reformation made for a time substantial progress in France. In answer, let me state that I do not mean to infer the too broad conclusion that a revolt from Catholicity was inevitable in non-Latin lands or that it is impossible in Latin. After all, neither Catholicity as such, nor heresy, nor schism know geographical or racial boundaries. All I do maintain is that the growing

racial consciousness of non-Latin races was bound in time to alter the submissive mental attitude of these peoples towards a so distinctly Latin civilization; that it was bound to readjust their relative positions to a more equal standing; that this constituted a mental condition fundamentally favorable to a real revolt once the man and the situation arose capable of bringing on such a revolt. It was the soil. And that soil lay across the Rhine and the Danube and the British Channel. Allowing for exceptions made so by peculiar conditions, the Reformation was remotely a racial movement of newer peoples away from Latin influence.

II.

The Political Cause.

It was secondly a political movement parallel with and part of the racial. In fact, it was more than anything else clearly a political revolt—a phase of that eternal conflict between the Church and the State; between the nation and the international religion; between Cæsar and Christ; between the spirit of this world and the spirit of eternity; between temporal and supernatural authority.

There had always been such a conflict off and on from the days of the Cæsars. The long duel between the Hohenstauffen and the Hildebrandine Popes, the conflict of the latter with a Philip the Fair or a Henry II were echoes of the same. But during the Middle Ages proper the authority of the Papacy and of ecclesiastics in general was too powerful even politically for the various nations to do more than spasmodically enter their protest.

The reason for the tremendous political power of the Church lay in and was justified by the political incapacity of the nations themselves, say what will Protestant critics of ecclesiastical ambition; in fact, such clerical domination was a political necessity for peoples so little advanced in political training.

Consider for a moment that there was no such thing as a "nation," as we understand it now, in the real Middle Ages. Germany as such dates practically from Bismarck's day. France was struggling for political entity with the English Kings as Norman feudal barons up to the days of Crecy and Poictiers. England, in the personnel of her rulers was more French than English up to the accession of Edward I. Spain was just emerging as a nation out of Castile and Aragon and Moorish domination. The rest of the world was a checker-board of little principalities. There was little or no national unity. The only real unity was what they all enjoyed as members of the Universal Church and the Holy Roman Empire. What law they had was a confused mass of customs expressed in charters and cartularies generally issued here and there to meet particular exigencies but only rawly codified and only rudely inspired and guided and classified by any legal principles.

Is it any wonder then that such peoples, political children, should have been overawed for the time being by the infinitely superior political wisdom of the Church and her priests; that they should not merely have allowed, but themselves favored the centering of so much political prestige in the hands of the same? Was not the old Church the inheritor of the ancient Imperial law that had once made peace and order from Britain to Persia? Was not her own Canon Law largely perfected on the model of that same as it came from the skilful hands of Justinian? Were not her clerics the best educated, practically the only higher-educated class, men versed in all known legal knowledge, men, moreover, trained by the very government of the Church in all departments of legal procedure? It was absolutely inevitable, even more, it was necessary for the very political training of nations that a vast amount of political prestige should fall into the hands of clerics as by far the most competent to handle such affairs.

It was, in fact a really tremendous power. Witness the Emperor Henry humbly seeking pardon from the Pope outside the gates of Canossa or the arms of his soldiers falling from their hands

as the thunder of excommunication against him rolls from beyond the Alps; a King John laying England as a fief on the steps of Peter's throne and Henry Plantagenet baring his back for the murder of Becket to the lash of a priest—and so on—Emperors and Kings ascending and descending their thrones at the word of a venerable priest without other arms but his spiritual authority.

And what brings out more clearly than even this the marvellous political power of the Church is her authority over and actual guidance of the purely local affairs of even such a supposedly independent people as the English. Even in legitimately spiritual concerns Papal authority was far greater than it has ever been since. Papal legates presided over National Councils, not as polite figureheads, but as real presidents, notwithstanding the prestige of Canterbury or York. Rome appointed bishops at will, often from foreign lands, chiefly Flanders and Normandy. Thousands of even the smallest benefices were held by absentee Roman ecclesiastics. English benefices contributed a constant stream of money in the shape of Papal taxation.

And what is most significant of all, the English clergy itself was a powerful political force. It is not exaggeration to say that from the Conquest to the reign of Edward I the English clergy supplied the larger part of the legal brains that so prudently evolved England out of feudal chaos. In fact, there was not until Edward's reign such a thing as a lay class of lawyers, so largely did clerics monopolize the law. Their influence is seen to be again all the greater when we remember that they had their own law courts wherein clerics (a considerable part of the population, by the way) were tried to the exclusion of secular control; courts too before which came an immense amount of causes involving wills, marriage, etc.

So then the Church was a veritable *imperium in imperio* precisely because of the political infancy and relative incapacity of the nations. But one can easily see that this political power would be inevitably curtailed just in proportion as national consciousness became acute, national entity

developed, the nation as such grew up to political manhood. With the coronation of Edward I this development begins to be apparent. It was by no means complete; not for a very long time to come. But it was at hand. And, in confirmation of the above it is precisely under Edward that we first notice the beginning of that steady, unswerving deliberate effort of the State to take over into its own hands so much of the political power hitherto exercised by the clergy. The famous "Circumspecte Agatis," which curtailed the procedure of clerical courts, was but the first of many other acts that eventually culminated in Henry VIII's absolute State supremacy.

Here again will be objected that there is no inherent antagonism between Catholicity and the State, and, therefore, no essential connection between their medieval quarrels and the rise of Protestantism. All of which is quite true.

But we are dealing with facts, not theories, and later medieval history bears unmistakeable testimony to the fact that these eternal quarrels over temporals did pave the way more than any other cause for Protestantism. With this in mind, Protestantism is easily explained, both as to its origin and as to its essential nature and subsequent history.

For surely this is written in big letters all over Protestantism from Luther to our own day, namely, it was the creation of the State and has ever been its willing creature. Not heresy, not scandals robbed England of her faith, but royal absolutism. The real parent of Protestantism was not Luther, but Machiavelli, the supreme philosopher of State supremacy and his later imitator, Erastus. Luther was its voice, its immediate general, and Calvin its theologian. But Machiavelli was its spirit and Erastus the chief unconscious application of that spirit.

And this explains why Protestantism is unlike any other heresy or schism, yet is a compound of them all. It is unlike the earlier Arianism and Nestorianism, in that it has no definite, fixed belief; yet it embraces all from Arianism to Swedenborgianism in that it complacently embraces all their errors. What differentiates it sharply from every other revolt from

the mother church is this, that it bows to the State in fact, however much it may assume the demeanor of spiritual independence. Wherever it flourished it instantly became not only a State-Church even as Catholicism was, but a subject of the State, regulated by the State; whether it were Episcopalian in England, Lutheran in Germany or Calvinistic in Geneva. Never, never, in its history has it opposed a Protestant Government. It did oppose a Catholic Government determinedly, but no Protestant Church ever fought its Protestant Government as such for the sake of the principle that the church as such was independent of the State. Never. Whereas, the history of the Catholic Church has been one long, deathless struggle for this principle from Cæsar to the French Republic.

This is the essential nature of Protestantism—the mark of Erastianism. And this is why Protestantism has ever used so effectively one murderous weapon against Catholicity, namely, ever accusing it of disloyalty to the State. Such was the cry from Henry Tudor's days to the coarse latter-day defamers right here in the United States. It has indeed been a terrible weapon. But it betrays clearly that Protestantism is essentially a State concern. It was never disloyal to its Protestant Government simply because it was the subject of that Government wherever possible.

Nor is this position weakened by the reflection that Catholic countries like France and Spain remained Catholic in spite of their political quarrels with the Church. Because we see now the same process taking place in them that took place in Northern Europe. Racial affinity with Catholicity, as above noted, kept Latin peoples loyal for some three centuries. But now even with them the leaven of Protestantism is working at last, and they too are becoming Erastian, they too embracing this latest and most comprehensive of all heresies. They are naturally the last to give up Medievalism.

This, I repeat, is the master-key to the unlocking of the mysterious Reformation which marked the passing of Medievalism. Without it, the history of the civilized world from Dante to our own times is a veritable enigma. With it in

hand, all becomes astonishingly lucid. Medievalism has passed wherever the State exercises superiority over the Church, either directly, as in England, Germany, France; or indirectly, by completely ignoring it as a civic factor, as in the United States. The old friendly union of Church and State, with deference of State to Church under Hildebrand and Louis IX, has passed. And with it civilization is changed; mankind's whole attitude towards religion has changed. Medievalism has given way, whether in Protestant England in the sixteenth century or in Catholic France in the twentieth, to something new, something utterly different in spirit—call it Modernism or anything else you will.

General Exhaustion.

The more remote, but also more profound cause of the passing of Medievalism lies in that seemingly universal law of decay, which affects peoples as groups no less than as individuals. Each civilization brings something new into human experience, flourishes for a period in proportion to the intrinsic value of that contribution, and then the inevitable exhaustion sets in just as a plant weakens in its very blossoming. Sooner or later all go the way of things that were, leaving only a residue of its genius for the permanent heritage of those that come after. Memphis, Ninevah, Babylon, Susa, Athens, Rome, Bagdad are so many milestones marking the passing of the great civilizations preceding the medieval. Augsburg and Spiers also mark its passing.

The reason must be, as above stated, that civilizations become exhausted and die simply because the peculiar genius of each can no longer produce anything new and is, like all old men, incapable of learning or assimilating anything new.

Such was the case of medieval civilization when the black cloud of Lutheranism was hanging over the Alps like Odoacer's warriors a thousand years before. It had been the most energetic, the most pure in its ideals, the most prolific of any

civilization the world had ever seen. It had shown all the titanic grandeur of Assyrian militarism, all the superb idealism of Israelitic spirituality, all the philosophic depth and artistic delicacy of the Greek, all the fiery fanaticism of the Arab, all the calm judicial temperament and world subduing sense of order of the Roman. With its marvellous Catholicity, it had all the traits of its predecessors, and yet stamped its own individuality upon them and besides produced more new ideas and institutions in astounding luxuriance. New ideas of the relation of state to religion, relation of governed to those governing, relations of employers and employes, a new architecture, a new art, a new philosophy, new languages with their literatures, new forms of government, the utterly new idea of a university. Other civilizations could glory in one or two of such creations. But Medievalism created anew in every department of life—political, economical, spiritual, artistic, intellectual, and created out of practical chaos in the face of almost superhuman difficulties and in a space of time astoundingly short. Allowing for the later artistic development of the 15th century, it accomplished all this in, roughly speaking, about three centuries, *i. e.*, from about 1000 A. D. to 1300 A. D. Never before had humanity put forth its powers with such tremendous energy or such brilliant and universal results.

Exhaustion, therefore, was inevitable. There must come a time when from sheer weariness it could produce no more. And what is to our point, the time was inevitable when, if it could not assimilate the new, then the new was bound to push it out of its way even as the Aryan Cyrus forever wrested the sceptre of empire from the Semitic race by the banks of the Euphrates or as Odoacer rudely swept aside Rome from her throne of the world.

By the opening of the sixteenth century Medievalism was exhausted. It had been practically exhausted since the day of Boniface VIII and Dante and was living on only with the inertia that seems to keep a civilization going until the final crash. With the exception of its great Catholic faith, which is ever new, though ancient, because of its divine character,

it had nothing new to offer. Its political creations, feudalism and the Holy Roman Empire were becoming as harmless as expiring chivalry so mercilessly laughed to death by the last of the Knights, Cervantes. The last word in its philosophy had been uttered over two centuries ago by Thomas of Aquin. Its religious militarism had fretted itself away in the Crusades. Its economic system of Gilds was going to pieces before the gradual advance of a wider mercantile system. It had said its last word in architecture as in philosophy and sung its last song with the Trouveres and Troubadours and Meistersingers and Minnesingers. In the university it had reached the limit of its mental capacity. Everywhere, except in art, it was at a standstill, and producing nothing new. The very gloriousness of its artistic splendor in the quattrocento seems, after all, only the hectic flush of destroying fever on its cheeks, only the gorgeousness of the setting of its sun. Babylon too was never so wondrous as on the eve of its destruction, nor Rome nor Athens so apparently marvellous as in their later days of decay. Perugino, Da Vinci, Michael Angelo, Raphael and that host of stupendous men of that age unconsciously mark its passing as much as Wycliffe and Savonarola. The very fact of its developing its aesthetic sense last shows that its energy in more substantial and virile directions was gone. It had put forth stupendous energy, and could now do no more than, like an old man, sit back at his ease midst the comforts of his prettily ornamented house.

Such being the case, either Medievalism inspired by some newly acquired force must assimilate the new or the new would push it aside in the rush of historic progress. Unfortunately it did not assimilate enough to guide the new. It did make a pathetic attempt to do so. Its painters enthusiastically embraced Greek art and its Academicians Greek and Latin literary culture. But there it stopped. In fact, in spite of their enthusiasm, these men never were quite Pagan. With all their ever increasing devotion to the physical beauty of Greek art, they could never completely accept its sensuousness as we moderns do so shamelessly. Fra Angelico dreams with his

sweet angels, Perugino ever paints like a sacristan, Botticelli's nude Venus rising from the sea looks ashamed of her nakedness as the hurrying winds speed to clothe it, Michael Angelo broods over the Last Judgment, Da Vinci's weary Christ sits at the Last Supper, even Raphael—most classic of all in sheer beauty of line—is ever the modest Christian. Whilst the Florentine Academicians pathetically struggled to combine Catholic asceticism and dogma and purity with classic daring of thought and love of the flesh, at best it was a feeble attempt to assimilate and guide the new.

No assimilation seems to have been even attempted along other lines. That splendid nerve of the Hildebrandine age seemed all gone. The courage that had assimilated Greek philosophy into Catholic theology seemed scared before the face of the new Humanism. The skill that made order out of feudal chaos was sadly impotent before the state-tyranny of a Henry Tudor. The old-time capacity to foresee and to start great movements like the Crusades gave way more and more to a policy of hesitating timidity, of negative opposition, instead of positive creation or leadership. Unlike his predecessor of the thirteenth century, who spurred on Dominic and De Montfort to wipe off the face of the earth the Albigensian heresy and Provençal culture on the field of Muret before it could become formidable, Leo X is blind to the seriousness of Luther's defection and Catholicity is allowed to perish by sheer default in more than one locality; perish by sheer political inanity, by a sort of hopeless incapacity that must have been delicious amusement for such a superbly wise woman as Elizabeth.

And so it went all along the line. And unless we grasp this fact of the "senility" of Medievalism, along, of course, with the other causes just mentioned, we will never comprehend how it was that just when it seemed most gorgeous, just when Raphael was working on his Transfiguration, just when the Roman Court was the Athens of all known culture; when the dismal prophecies of that poor, misguided hero, Savonarola, were become memories; when the anxieties of the Avignon period and the stormy excesses of the Borgias had become only

more horrid memories; when a Catholic empire, that of Charles V, stretched from the Baltic to the Pillars of Hercules and across leagues of water to a new continent; when Wycliffe and John Huss were dust in their tombs! when, in a word, the serenity of Raphael's Transfiguration was typical of the cerulean peace overhanging the world—unless, I say, we once realize that Medievalism was senile and going the way of all other civilizations by force of the eternal law of birth and decay, we will never comprehend how it was that across that blue sky shot so suddenly the bolt of Protestantism, that at the shove of a mere Augustinian friar (not a fraction equal in genius or intellect to Arius or Nestorius or Pelagius) the system tumbled down like so many old unsteady castles into the waters of the Rhine and the Elbe and the Thames and the Firth of Forth. To attempt to explain it otherwise as just another heresy is futile. It was not a heresy, not a Reformation, not even primarily a religious movement—it was a revolution, a complete change in the mental attitude of civilized mankind.

Aftermath.

One or two reflections demand attention before this subject is finally dismissed. They bear upon the resulting trend of human affairs subsequent to the passing of Medievalism.

And, now, looking back over all that terrible time, it would seem that neither have Catholics reason to despair nor Protestants reason to boast in triumph over the dying of that civilization. It is true that the Church lost heavily, yet suffers from the blow, will suffer for a long time to come. But the Church is not hopelessly bound with any age, race or human system. Catholicity is not Medievalism, rather was Medievalism only an historic phase in her existence. It can die and she live on just the same. She is not wedded to the human past. Though ancient, she is ever in the present with an eye for the future. Still less is she inextricably bound up with the genius of any one race. Though Roman as to her seat of government, though Latin genius directed her counsels in the

Middle Ages, she is by nature Catholic and essentially as much Teuton or Scandinavian or Chinese as she is Latin. Nor is she wedded to any human political system, be it Roman Imperialism or Medieval Feudalism or American Democracy or English Royalty. Her intrinsic principles are those of Christ. And, therefore, it is idle, it shows a lack of understanding of her nature, a poor estimate of her recuperative power and general intelligence, if her children sit down amidst the ruins of Medievalism and bewail its passing as an irretrievable disaster to her. It is at bottom a form of "protestantism" to forever protest against present-day evils, to ever be a negative complainer, instead of girding one's loins and emulating the "positiveness" of medieval Catholics. It is Catholic to face the world boldly, like Benedict and Francis and Dominic and Hildebrand did in much more perilous times. After all, it is only faith to believe that the Church is just as capable of winning the world now as she did in those awful days when Rome fell crashing to the earth. It is a lack of faith to sit idly by bewailing the "good old days that are no more."

And Protestants—on calm reflection, have they such cause for triumph? After all, theirs is being daily seen more and more as a Pyrrhic victory, a disastrous success. In de-Catholicizing half the world, they have de-Christianized it. The names of Luther and Calvin and Wesley are yet powerful names; but only names. The religious principles those gigantic men fought for so fiercely are now matters of past history. The non-Catholic half of the world has no faith at bottom, at least none that its votaries would die for and few do live for. The pall of religious indifference lies sombre and still over the faith of Augsburg and Spiers and Geneva and Westminster. And what is worst of all, the old joyousness of religion, the old logical mental habits of minds in studying the relations of religion to life in all aspects, the intimate and beneficent connection of religion with every act of daily life, the old serenity of a universal faith brooding over the world, fine and peaceful and vast as the ancient "Pax Romana," all of which was the happy possession of medieval peoples—all that has gone. And

what have they in its place? Ah, me! the weariness and the dreariness of it all!

Luther's bronze statue boldly fronting Thomas Circle in Washington is an anomaly. Many a time passing it I say to myself—"Too bad we lost such a force." I have utter contempt for his moral character. Father Denifle has forever de-canonized Luther. But, oh! what a strength is there, what a rugged savageness, what an untutored directness, what a boisterous "sense of self," loud and brawling (if you wish) and "beery"—so essentially different from the "wine" exalted visions of a cultured Pico della Mirandola. Say what you will, there is power, tremendous, crashing, crunching like a glacier, except that it moves swiftly, and the sculptor did well when he worked in bronze—not casting on a small scale as he of the doors to the Florentine Baptistry—but in the rough and the big. Yes; Catholic as I am—that is all there.

But how many present-day Protestants see that! A Catholic can grasp it. Why? Simply because with all the heroism and legends and logic of the Middle Ages chasing one another through his head, he can grasp the bigness of this man of bronze.

But to the Modern Protestant—What does that statue mean? Nothing but some sort of historical and more or less sentimental "protest" against Rome; without reason, without logic, without history,—just a blind insensate "protest" against something not drank in with his mother's milk. He cannot even comprehend the bigness of that weak man whose name he utters in traditional reverence. Why? Because he himself, a Protestant, has become religiously anaemic, philosophically a "squarer of the circle," historically a contradiction of all historical continuity, practically a Hedonist wearing a Christian garment. Yes! Protestantism cannot admire even the very rugged grandeur of its own founders, simply because it cannot understand the grandeur of a "conviction." And having lost this, it is starving, hungering for that spirtual food which Catholicity so liberally feeds to its children.

Hence it is not strange to see it turning back to Medievalism

in a timid, half-shamefaced fashion, like the Prodigal returning home from the husks. For what else mean all this otherwise inexplicable revival of interest in Medieval culture? Botticelli's wan Madonnas and Fra Angelico's joyous Angels once more look down into the faces of Luther's children in their parlors and bedrooms. Old wood-carved stalls, once filled by chanting monks, now serve as chairs for the very people whose ancestors drove out the monks. Joan of Arc finds her devotees among the kin of Shakespeare who maligned her. The tremendous idealism of Francis of Assisi is like sweet waters to these men and women dying of thirst in the Sahara of spiritual dryness. And so all along the line. The spiritual children of Luther and Calvin and Cranmer and John Knox are ever seen wandering almost pathetically among the ruins and records of Medievalism for the spiritual life denied them by their chilly Protestantism. Old castles, cathedrals, carvings in ivory and wax or wood or bronze, vestments, time-worn missals, armor, objects of piety, bed-room furniture, anything touched and beautified and blessed by that wondrously live and joyous and brave spirit of Medievalism is hunted after with feverish eagerness by even the most money-mad American financier. It is because Protestantism is weary and hungry for all that beauty and life which it killed long ago.

And so, in conclusion, it is not exaggerated to say that the Passing of Medievalism in the long run is a greater loss to Protestantism than to Catholicity. Because, after all, Catholicity can get along without it, or rather Catholicity has it always. The same joyousness and bravery that carved monks' stalls and put sweet songs on the lips of Francis and Catherine of Siena, today, though in different ways, repeats all that in the sweetness of the First Communion of the little children and in the lives of a Philip Neri and a Curé of Ars. Under different forms there is and always will be the same abundance and variety of spiritual life.

But, strange as it may sound, Protestantism cannot get along without Medievalism, simply because it cannot do without Catholicity. No mere negation or "protest" can live by itself.

It is a parasite of its very nature. Protestantism cannot, I repeat, live happily without that very spirit of Medievalism it once boasted of destroying. Because that Medievalism, with all its barbarity in some ways, essentially represented an all-around healthy view of life, a catholicity of mind which saw good in all things and thereby rejoiced in all things, which put each thing in its proper relation to all others and hence was at peace, which solved the vexatious problem of the relation between soul and the body, between the Church and the State, between God and Cæsar. It was the only logical view of life, and it is a view which even now any Catholic can have as clearly as did Francis or Godfrey. But it is a view utterly of its very essence impossible to the spirit of division represented by Protestantism. It is not Catholicity, but Protestantism, which lost most in the Passing of Medievalism.

Lucian Johnston.

MR. LANG'S REPLY.

In his article, *Dr. Bolling and Homeric Armour, Catholic University Bulletin,* XVII, pp. 629-636, Mr. Lang has touched lightly upon many sides of the Homeric question. His paper was occasioned by my article, *Homeric Armor and Mr. Lang*, but the full reply to this, although written, he has preferred to suppress and to content himself with an outline of his criticism, and the treatment of other topics. His criticism of my paper—and it is only with this that I shall deal—is that I misapprehended the purpose of his book; that I advocated a position taken in 1901—but merely as a modification of a still earlier view—which has been rendered untenable by more recent discoveries; that the study of certain works will show the error of my objections to the theories advocated in his *Homer and his Age;* and that I absurdly accused him of attempting an impossibility. To each of these points I shall reply as briefly as is compatible with the fact that the discussion is carried on before a body of non-expert readers; to experts I should simply have said, "form your own opinions." What I have to say I should have preferred to print immediately after Mr. Lang's article, but this was unfortunately impossible on account of my absence in Europe. The fact that the November *Bulletin* is devoted to the Rector's annual report has rendered necessary a further delay. For the convenience of the reader I shall therefore reprint the few passages on which I intend to comment.

"*Dr. Bolling, when he wrote, entertained the misapprehension* (pp. 670-671) *that, in my book,* Homer and his Age (1906) *I made 'an effort to appeal the Homeric Question from expert to popular judgment,' and that I addressed 'the general English-speaking public.' In the name of the Ashmolean, what has popular judgment or the English-speaking public to do with the Homeric Question? I wrote for a few men of*

education who take a special interest in that great problem. . ."

Of course no one can possibly know as well as Mr. Lang what audience he was addressing. Unfortunately for us he has chosen to tell us in a phrase which I do not find unambiguous "a few men of education who take a special interest in that great problem." When I first read the phrase I understood it to mean a few Homeric scholars, a few men whose study of the question give them the right to an expert opinion on the subject. This is what the phrase must mean to prove that my regarding his book as an appeal from expert to non-expert judgment was a 'misapprehension.' But as I recalled the book I became more and more convinced that this couldn't be what Mr. Lang meant. To give the grounds for this conviction in detail would lead too far. I should have something to say about the way in which writers of books familiar to scholars are introduced to Mr. Lang's audience; I should have to discuss the different use made of authorities in scientific and in popularizing books.[1] Instead I shall quote three passages from *Homer and his Age*. The first is in the preface, p. viii: "But the number and perseverance of the separatists make on 'the general reader' the impression that Homeric unity is *chose jugée*, that *scientia locuta est*, and has condemned Homer. This is far from being the case; the question is still open; 'science' herself is subject to criticism; and new materials accruing yearly, forbid a tame acquiescence in hasty theories.

May I say a word to the lovers of poetry, who, in reading Homer, feel no more doubt than in reading Milton that, on the whole they are studying a work of one age, by one author? Do not let them be driven from their natural impression by the statement that Science has decided against them." On p. 25 f. Mr. Lang explains why his criticism is directed in the first instance against Mr. Leaf, and (wrongly or rightly) I apprehend that he intends to reach the audience described as

[1] In passing I may remark that "Foreign critic for foreign critic" (*Reply*, p. 630) would be a beautiful example, not without parallel in *Homer and his Age*.

Mr. Leaf's; "His most erudite work is based on a wide knowledge of German Homeric speculation, of the exact science of Grammar, of archaeological discoveries, and of manuscripts. His volumes are, I doubt not, as they certainly deserve to be, on the shelves of every Homeric student, old or young, and doubtless their contents reach the higher forms in schools, though there is reason to suppose that, about the unity of Homer, schoolboys remain conservative." [2]

It may however occur to some one that Mr. Lang is not speaking directly to these "general readers" who are in danger of being "driven from their natural impression" by the mere statement that the verdict of science is against them and that he is trying to reach "the higher forms in schools" only indirectly by inciting a "few men of education and special interest" in the Homeric Question to appeal to a wider audience. The supposition may not be excluded by the letter of these passages, but I know of nothing in the rest of the book that would support it nor can I conceive of any more effective appeal to "general readers" than Mr. Lang's own book. However the question is settled by turning to page 249: "Any scholar who looks at these pages"—a strange phrase in a book written for scholars—"knows all about the proofs of grammar of a late date in the *Odyssey* and the four contaminated books of the *Iliad*. But it may be well to give a few specimens, for the enlightenment of less learned readers of Homer." The specimens which follow should be intelligible to any freshman who has offered Greek for matriculation.

These passages show pretty clearly what elements are present in Mr. Lang's audience, and how we must interpret his reply. He means as I understand him, that his book is not an appeal to popular judgment because it does not appeal to the judgment

[2] I am haunted by the feeling that the close of this sentence is an allusion to a passage in the *Classical Review* about the staunch Unitarianism of sixth-form schoolboys, and the value of their impressions for Homeric criticism. I am unable however to lay my hand immediately upon the passage; and my argument can spare the aid to be gained from it.

of all the people. He appeals, it is true, to "general readers" guided by "natural impressions," and endangered by rumors about what science has determined; but not to *all* general readers, only to such as can read Homer, and care to do so, and those who possess this "education and interest" are after all "few." This view of his book coincides with my original opinion of it. Whether my opinion was badly expressed or whether Mr. Lang was careless in his "apprehension" of it, anyone may decide for himself by referring to pages 670-671 of my article. But I should like to ask: What—in the name of the Smithsonian—has the opinion even of this élite body of (non-expert) "general readers" got to do with the decision of the Homeric Question?

"*He professes* (p. 673) *that he 'has nothing new to say upon the subject' and 'stands essentially on the position of Robert.' Now Robert's book is of* 1901 *and I write in* 1911. *Robert modified the views of Reichel, and we now know a multitude of archaeological facts which were unknown to Reichel and Robert in* 1901. *Some of them I knew in* 1906, *more when I wrote the* World of Homer (1910), *and now I know more than I did in that year.*"

I understand Mr. Lang to mean a multitude of facts relating to Greek archaeology. Of these only the ones that bear on the question of armor concern us, and we may fairly presume that Mr. Lang published what he knew. In *Homer and his Age* (1906) he devoted pp. 108-175 and ten illustrations to the question of Homeric armor. Among the illustrations we would naturally look for the new facts; they are: Fig. 1.—The Vase of Aristonothos (published apparently 1878, cf. Pauly-Wissowa, *s. v.*); Fig. 2.—Dagger with Lion-Hunters (discovered in 1876); Fig. 3.—A Dipylon Vase (not from *Jour. Hell. Stud.*, XIII, 21-24, 1892, as one would naturally understand from the reference; but from *Ath. Mittheil.*, XVII, (1892), p. 215); Fig. 5.—Rings: Swords and Shields (discovered in 1876); Fig. 6.—Fragments of Warrior Vase (discovered in 1876); Fig. 7.—Fragment of Siege Vase (discovered in 1876); Fig. 9.—Gold Corslet (discovered in 1876). There is (p. 121)

an allusion to the Aeginetan treasure now in the British Museum, and published by Evans, *Jour. Hell. Stud.* XIII, 1892. The other facts on which Mr. Lang's reasoning is based are derived from: Schuchhardt (-Sellers) 1891; *Class. Rev.*, IX, 1895; Helbig, *Sur la question Mycénéenne,* 1896; Tsountas and Manatt, 1897; Maspero, *Hist. anc. II,* 1897; *Jour. Hell. Studies,* XX, 1899, and previous volumes; *Jour. Anthr. Institute,* XXX, 1900; Murray, *Excavations in Cyprus,* 1900; Ridgeway, *Early Age of Greece,* 1901; and Reichel's and Robert's works. The only citations of works later than 1901 which I can find are: p. 115 n. a paraphrase from the *Odyssey,* made in Browne's *Handbook of Homeric Study,* 1905, is reproved as inaccurate; p. 123, Walters' *History of Ancient Pottery,* 1905, is cited for the Dodwell *pyxis* (discovered about 1800); p. 155, the same for the *amphora* of Euthymides (catalogued by Jahn 1854). Mr. Lang's reasoning in this part of *Homer and his Age* (1906) may have been right or wrong, but it was not based on a single fact of Greek Archaeology [3] not known in 1901.

This was the book which I criticized and I might stop here; but nevertheless let us look for the "more when I wrote the *World of Homer* (1910)." We are concerned with pages 60-80 and the acompanying illustrations. Figs. 1, 5, 6, 7, are familiar vase-paintings, all occuring in Engelmann and Anderson's *Pictorial Atlas,* 1895; I shall not take the time to run them down in detail. Fig. 2.—Dagger with Lion-Hunters (see above); Fig. 3.—Tirynthian Vase (published 1885). New material is the Frontispiece, a *pithos* from Sparta, published in *Ann. Brit. School at Athens,* XII, 1905-6, cited here to illustrate a type of armor which is *not* Homeric. Fig. 4.—Cretan Seal-Impressions: Minoan Armour, at last brings us "the multitude of facts which were unknown to Reichel and Robert in 1901."

[3] Mr. Lang might have claimed with correctness that he had introduced new ethnological evidence—armor of American Indians, and Normans, cf. Frontispiece, and Figs. 4 and 8. Had he done so, it would have been easy to show its worthlessness. Omission of reference to it in my article was intentional.

It is interpreted by Mr. Lang as representing "a man in a cuirass of plate, a thick belt of plate, and a mailed kirtle" p. 71 n. At Haghia Triada in Crete 161 such seal impressions were found, and published by Halbherr, *Mon. Ant.*, XIII, (1903); and in the same volume was published by Savignoni a steatite vase showing a corslet (?) of similar design. The "multitude" is therefore two closely related facts, the seal and the vase. Does this revolutionize the subject? I think not. That a corslet is represented at all is extremely uncertain, for the vase Mr. Lang professes (p. 73) that he is unable to decide between a corslet and a cope. It is hard to see why he should be so positive about the seal which fails to show the man's arms at all. Even granting that it is a corslet, the material is indeterminable as Savignoni says. I should prefer—if I could convince myself that the thing is a corslet—to take his second alternative *"una specie di cuoio o di stoffa esternamente tutta coperta di anelli o di scaglie metalliche,"* in which case it would be a confirmation of Robert's recognition, p. 37 ff., of a Mycenean corslet[4] For the sake of completeness I may add that of works later than 1901, Mr. Lang now cites Miss Stawell and Mr. Murray but never as witnesses to new facts, and repeats the second of his citations of Walters' book.

As Mr. Lang has not printed his full reply I cannot ascertain fully what facts he has learned in the last year, but cf. below.

"Robert modified the views of Reichel."

Reichel held that Mycenaean armor was practically universal in the *Iliad;* Robert limited it to something like one-fourth of the poem. This *is* a modification. I used to think that Mr. Lang had selected Reichel as his objective merely because Mr. Leaf had disseminated Reichel's views among such "general readers" as come into consideration, and even in "the higher forms of schools." Now I am convinced that Mr. Lang has never grasped the important difference between Reichel's and

[4] Savignoni polemicizes against Robert, but in my opinion, unsuccessfully.

Robert's position. Whatever refutes Reichel is in Mr. Lang's eyes destructive of Robert also, and this is one of the fundamental defects of his treatment of the question. For example Mr. Evans argued in 1900, *Jour. Anthr. Inst.*, xxx, p. 213 f., from certain Cyprian discoveries that round shields and metal corslets must be expected in the earliest parts of the Epic. This was intended to tell against the view put forward in Reichel's first edition that such weapons were extremely late intruders in all parts of the *Iliad*. Obviously it has not the same force against Robert's 'modified' view, that such weapons are found in about three-fourths of the *Iliad*. Later discoveries —cf. Hogarth, *Ionia and the East*, p. 54—have since shown that Mr. Evans dated the finds several centuries too early. Yet Mr. Lang continues to appeal to this article as if it refuted Robert's view. So also he derives satisfaction from the fact "that Drerup prefers my treatment of Homeric Armour to that of Reichel." In some respects I myself could say, cf. p. 700 of my former article, as much for Mr. Lang.

"I leave Dr. Bolling to study the works of which I offer a list."

To ascertain that Mr. Lang was right I presumed, but this has so far proved a misapprehension. For *Journal of Anthropological Institute* (not *Society*), xxx, and *Monumenti Antichi*, xiii, pp. 42, 114 (not both by Halbherr) enough has been said; Evans, *Scripta Minoa*, i, p. 42 represents "what, from some of the better drawn examples, which show the plate and shoulder pieces more clearly, may with great probability be regarded as a cuirass." This is too uncertain to build upon; p. 75 and note adds nothing. Miss Stawell, *Homer and the Iliad* (1909) and Lippold, *Griechische Schilde* (1909), had not reached me at the time (July 1910) of the writing of my article. That they do not hold the same views which I do is true; but this is not the place for a discussion of such serious and careful studies. The cardinal point at issue between Mr. Lang and myself was whether there was one or more types of shield in Homer; both these authors like Robert, whom

I was following, take the latter side of that question. Lippold calls the recognition of the round shield in the *Iliad,* the chief merit of Robert's work, p. 462; this is the one point which Mr. Lang is most reluctant to concede. Again Lippold would see in Homer not Mycenaean but Dipylon shields; while Mr. Lang pronounced Dipylon shields manifestly post-Homeric (*Homer and his Age,* p. 142), and thought—disregarding fluctuations—that Mycenaean shields plated with bronze were the real Homeric armament. Ostern, *Die Bewaffung in Homers Ilias* is unfortunately still inaccessible to me; his views are to be expected to resemble those of Lippold, cf. Lippold, p. 402.

"*Dr. Bolling's statement* (p. 696) *that, in my part of the translation of the Iliad* (*Lang, Leaf, and Myers*), *I 'strove to conceal a flaw' in my present theory, by 'beginning a new paragraph' at a certain point, involves an impossibility. When the translation was written, thirty years ago, neither I, nor Mr. Leaf, nor Mr. Myers dreamed that the question of Homeric armour would arise; and certainly I had no ideas on the subject. In fact the passages on armour, in the translation, have not been corrected in the light of any theories which we, the translators, have since entertained.*"

The passage cited contains no reference whatsoever to "a flaw *in Mr. Lang's present theory.*" The "flaw" discussed is in the text of Homer, and is caused by the intrusion of a single line which provides Patroklos with a corslet. When I find now that this line does not harmonize with the previous description of what happened to Patroklos' helmet and spear and shield when Apollo struck him; I am liable to be told that I am "making (unnecessary) difficulties," and following "my German authorities" who "permit their prepossessions to divert them from the true interpretation of the facts." It is therefore of some use to show that Mr. Lang when "he had no ideas upon the subject" and consequently no "prepossessions" also felt the incongruity, and sought to minimize it (the best thing possible thirty years ago) by separating the

incongruous elements so as to bring them in different paragraphs. That Mr. Lang, like the rest of the world thirty years ago, "had no ideas on the subject" was precisely the reason why he was cited. For further, though unnecessary, proof that I was perfectly aware that the translation dates from a time when neither Mr. Lang "nor Mr. Leaf, nor Mr. Myers," nor anybody else "dreamed that the question of Homeric armour would arise," I may refer Mr. Lang to p. 673 f. and p. 687 of the article to which he was replying.

George Melville Bolling.

CARDINAL GIBBONS MEMORIAL HALL.

At the close of the meeting of the Board of Trustees on Thursday, October 12, the cornerstone of the Cardinal Gibbons Memorial Hall was laid by His Eminence, the Chancellor of the University, in the presence of a large gathering of bishops, priests and people representing nearly every diocese and every State of the Union. This ceremony formed the central feature in the academic celebration of the Cardinal's jubilee, and, in a certain sense, the national celebration also, since the people in all parts of the country have contributed towards the building and, while aiding the development of the University, have paid to the Cardinal the most acceptable tribute that could have been offered. It is extremely gratifying to him that the permanent memorial of his priestly and cardinalitial jubilee should take the form of a Hall on the grounds of the University and especially that it should be devoted to the service of our Catholic people as a residence for lay students.

On the other hand, this occasion is significant as showing that our people, as time goes on, have more accurate ideas of what is at once appropriate and practical in connection with such celebrations. They have come to realize the value of education for its own sake and its necessity for the cause of religion; and they understand that the most fitting tribute to personal worth is the furtherance of those large beneficent designs for which the recipient of their tribute has lived and labored. It was the Middle Ages, the Ages of Faith, that gave Oxford and Cambridge those halls and colleges which have grown more beautiful during the centuries and which in their outward forms are still the most graceful expression of the academic spirit. They bear the names or perpetuate the memory of men who were equally devoted to the Church and to learning. Most of them were ecclesiastics, some were bishops, all were men of sound practical sense. They were concerned

for the interests of religion not merely in one parish or in one diocese but in all England, or rather in the whole world, since the universities of that day were in the highest degree cosmopolitan. Thus all the nations of Europe were the beneficiaries of the great English founders—of Merton and Balliol, of Wykeham and Balsham and Gonville; and the names of these men will live long after the last trace of the structures which they built has disappeared.

What is more important, there is still strong in the Catholic Church that love of intellectual and spiritual things which created the universities of old. It was manifested at the inception of the Catholic University and it has proven its efficacy at each new phase of the University's growth. It has never been more timely or more energetic than in projecting and constructing the Gibbons Memorial.

It is less than a year since the erection of this Hall was decided upon, and barely six months since the work began. That it has advanced so rapidly is due chiefly to the activity of the Association which had charge of the undertaking and which included in its membership prominent representatives of the clergy and laity, with the following officers:

President and Treasurer, Rt. Rev. Owen B. Corrigan, D. D., Auxiliary Bishop of Baltimore; *Corresponding Secretary*, Very Rev. George A. Dougherty, D.D., Vice-Rector of the University.

Executive Committee: Baltimore—Samuel S. Bennett, Charles J. Bonaparte, Rev. Fred. Bott, C. SS. R., Joseph W. Brooks, Rev. M. F. Foley, Frank Furst, Michael Jenkins, Jerome M. Joyce, Philip C. Mueller, Jev. James A. Nolan, Thomas O'Neill, T. Herbert Shriver, William C. Sullivan, Rev. John T. Whelan, James R. Wheeler, George Yakel. Washinton—D. J. Callahan, Aidan Dillon, O. H. P. Johnson, Patrick J. Halligan, George E. Hamilton, Rev. J. D. Marr, Rev. J. R. Matthews, Rt. Rev. James T. Mackin, P. J. Nee, Joseph E. Ralph, Rt. Rev. Dr. William T. Russell, B. F. Saul, Nicholas H. Shea, P. C. Sullivan, J. Selwin Tait.

The plans were prepared by Messrs. Thomas H. Poole and Co., of New York City, and the contract was awarded to the

Boyle Robertson Construction Company of Washington. The building is located on Michigan Avenue a short distance west of Albert Hall. It is in the Tudor Gothic style, three stories high with a total length of 267 feet and a depth of 40 feet. A central tower 36 feet square rises to a height of 70 feet. The material is Port Deposit granite with Indiana limestone for trim. In its interior finish, arrangement and furnishings, the Hall provides fully for the safety and comfort of its occupants. When completed it will accomodate 130 students. At present the portion west of the tower is finished and is occupied. The tower is also in course of construction and it is hoped that the entire building may be completed within a year.

The cornerstone was laid on the northwest angle of the tower, which at the time had been bullt up to the water table and upon which a temporary platform was laid for the accomodation of the speakers, the prelates and the invited guests.

The procession moved from McMahon Hall at 4 p. m., crossed the campus and preceded the Cardinal to the platform. During the ceremony, appropriate anthems were sung by the university choir with accompaniment by the U. S. Marine Band. When the stone had been placed in position, the Most Rev. John M. Farley, Archbishop of New York, addressed the Cardinal on behalf of the Board of Trustees.

Archbishop Farley's Address.

As Vice-President of the Board of Trustees, I am privileged to stand here before this distinguished assembly and speak on this historic occasion—the double jubilee of him whom we are proud to regard as the *decus, honor et gloria* of the Church in America.

The massive and majestic monument, of which we have just laid the cornerstone, is to be known while its walls shall stand as the fitting but all-inadequate testimonial of our gratitude to James Cardinal Gibbons, ninth Metropolitan of the venerable See of Baltimore, the mother see of the Church in the United States, America's second cardinal and the first chancellor of the

Catholic University of America, the most beloved man of the American Church today.

This cornerstone is one of the milestones in the path of our University on its way to what we may now confidently regard as a glorious future; and on such occasions as this it is usual and useful to look back for a moment on our history.

Although only twenty years have elapsed since its birth, our University was conceived in the minds of the fathers of the Second Council of Baltimore (1866) nearly half a century ago. They desired earnestly to have in this country, under Catholic auspices, a university in which all branches of literature and science, both sacred and profane, should be taught. But the time was not yet ripe for the realization of this hope. This came when the young and energetic archbishop of this venerable diocese was appointed by the great Leo XIII as his legate to preside over the most important council ever held in this country, the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore in 1884.

The priestly experience of Cardinal Gibbons seems to have been, in all its phases a preparation for the great work of founding and fostering the Catholic University of America. Like the present Holy Father he has filled every position in the ranks of the clergy. Beginning as a young curate he became pastor and then secretary to the great Martin John Spalding, one of his illustrious predecessors, who found in him the Leonidas well fitted to man the Thermopylae of the mountains of North Carolina where hostility to the Church was strong and where opposition grew out of ignorance because there was none to break the bread of life to the people. There, as bishop, Monsignor Gibbons passed the most laborious years of his early missionary life—" in journeying often, in perils of waters, in perils in the city, in perils in the wilderness, in perils in the sea, in labor and painfulness, in much watchings," to the end that he might become all to all and win all to Christ. There he gathered from contact with many outside the Church, from meditation and study, materials for the work which has made him known through all the land and beyond its borders, the " Faith of our Fathers," which has led so many in the way of peace and which will go down the ages enlightening souls when these memorial walls shall have crumbled into dust.

The prudence, learning and zeal evinced by Archbishop Gibbons during the Council, and his tactful guidance of the deliberations

of the entire American episcopate in dealing with the most momentous questions, told that the hour and the man had come for the inauguration of the great work of a Catholic university. Then and there it was decided to establish a "*seminarium principale*" as the nucleus out of which a complete Catholic university should later develop.

In 1885 the Sovereign Pontiff expressed his great pleasure at learning of this decision and gave his formal approval in a letter to Archbishop Gibbons in 1887; two years later the Pope approved the constitution of the University and granted it full power to confer degrees. In this letter the Holy Father defined the scope of the Catholic University, viz., "to provide instruction in every department of learning to the end that the clergy and the laity alike might have ample opportunity to satisfy fully their laudable desire for knowledge."

It was thus that this great central seat of learning sprang up under the control of the bishops of the United States, immediately governed by a board of trustees composed of bishops, priests and laymen who represent the American Catholic Church in the ownership and direction of the Catholic University. While the responsibility in general for the working of the institution rests on the Board of Trustees, the central pivot in which every movement of the great and growing mechanism of the institution turned was the Chairman of the Board, the Chancellor of the University. In times of stress all learned to turn to him; to him everyone looked for inspiration in each new departure in the career of the institution, and in every change and circumstance he was found equal to the demand.

But while Cardinal Gibbons thus rendered invaluable service from the beginning in every juncture, never in its history was his indomitable courage, the quality most needed in every vast undertaking, so notably shown as in the dark days of its greatest trial. For trials it has had in common with all great things begun for God and the good of religion. For then even those who loved the University with the love of a strong man's soul lost heart and hope, felt in all sincerity that the work had been premature and that this trial was the extremest test under which it must go down, to await other times and other men in generations to come. And these did not even hesitate to advise that the enterprise be abandoned. Then it was that he whom we delight to honor by these walls proved the bulwark of the people. "Never,"

he said, "while I have the power to wield a pen in appeal or lift a voice in pleading, shall this work of religion stop. God wills it; the work must go on."

And he trumphed, aye, almost alone. Yes, in that crucial time he might be said to have tread the winepress alone. And today is laid upon his venerable brow the crown which is the fruit of this courage of the Cross.

If today the Catholic University stands forth before the world a thing of beauty and of fairest promise, fairer and more prosperous than at any time in its history, no longer a source of painful anxiety, not only for its future but for its very existence, it is, under God, wholly due to the indomitable labor of his Eminence Cardinal Gibbons.

It is said, "Put not your trust in princes." In this our prince of the Church we have trusted, and we have not been confounded. His princedom is not of this world. He worked and prayed and hoped in the Lord and has not been disappointed.

These things, too, he has done for the University not only while he was laboring in his own diocese, but while his influence was being cast in favor of every good and patriotic cause throughout the length and breadth of the land. And with it all he seems to renew his youth, like the eagle. The winter of discontent seems never to have dawned for him, but rather does he seem to enjoy a perpetual Indian summer. Long be it so.

Your Eminence, you may see the years of Leo, your great friend whose noble purpose in founding this University you have so zealously and so successfully striven to realize, and may the abiding hope of the Apostle of the Gentiles be yours, that through all the vicissitudes of effort and success, of solicitude and of joy, you may say with him: "As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day."

The Archbishop was followed by Rev. Dr. Charles F. Aiken of the Faculty of the Sacred Sciences, who spoke as follows:

Dr. Aiken's Address.

Your Eminence:

It is with mingled feelings of pride and gratitude that we greet you here today. We, members of the Catholic University

of America, esteem it an honor to add our tribute of hearty congratulation to the many expressions of good-will that your jubilee has called forth. To have lived a faithful priest of God for half a century, bearing as time went on the accumulating honors and responsibilities of bishop, archbishop and cardinal, and giving ample proof that each successive dignity had been deservedly bestowed, all this, surely, is a sign of greatness and a cause of just pride to every Catholic heart. What a beautiful and inspiring example is not a life like yours, consecrated to the spiritual uplift of your fellow-men and rich in good deeds! You "have taught many and have strengthened weary hands," and glorious is the promised reward, for "they that instruct many unto justice shall shine as stars for all eternity." In your long life of unbroken devotion to the priestly ideal set forth by Christ, one may learn many a useful lesson,—that there is nothing nobler than a life of generous activity in the service of God and one's fellow-men; that true devotion to the Church does but foster loyalty to a State like ours; that dignity of office need not exclude simplicity of manner; that the authority of the priesthood shows grandest when exercised with kindness and fatherly affection; that the influence of the church leader on his generation is enlarged beyond measure by a sympathetic interest in the great social problems that are pressing for solution.

In length of service you stand today the dean of the bishops and archbishops of this country. Yet, despite your long span of life, we would not call you old. There is a pathos in a busy, useful life that runs out into a sterile old age, indifferent to the urgent calls of the present, ever gazing with vacant stare into the dim past. Beautiful, on the other hand, is an age like yours, advanced in years, but still active and fruitful, giving to your youthful contemporaries a high example of untiring industry and of keen interest in the rising questions of the day. Old age like this is something precious. It is one of the brightest ornaments that can grace a man. It is the nearest approach to perpetual youth.

While we congratulate you on having attained so happily the jubilee of your priesthood and the twenty-fifth anniversary of your elevation to the office of cardinal, we are glad, as members of the University, to take this occasion to express to you our feeling of profound gratitude. The laying of the cornerstone

of this handsome building does but call attention to an act of beneficence on your part as gracious as it is far reaching in its benign influence. Through a singular love of the University, over which you have exercised the office of Chancellor from the beginning, and for which you have made many a generous sacrifice in the past, you have ordained that the visible token of esteem, with which a host of admirers throughout the land wish to mark your jubilee, should take the form of a hall of study, with the view to promote the efficiency of this noble seat of learning. We deeply appreciate this generous act of faith in the Catholic University of America. The Gibbons Memorial Hall, in the shadow of whose ornate walls we are gathered to-day, will tell to coming generations of the large-heartedness of the prelate whose name it bears, who, unmindful of self, turned a gift from the people into a perennial source of usefulness in the cause of higher Christian education, verifying the words of the great Master he served so well, "it is more blessed to give than to receive."

The third speaker was Dr. Daniel W. Shea, Dean of the Faculty of Sciences.

Dr. Shea's Address.

Your Eminence:

Permit me, in the name of the lay faculties of the University, to give in a few words, expression to thoughts which the beautiful and noble significance of today's celebration awakens.

In the development of mankind, it has been permitted to but few men that their names should mark both the founding and the splendid growth of a great undertaking. Your Eminence belongs to those few. And more fortunate than most of them, Your Eminence still lives, in the fulness of strength, to see the fruits of your work before you in this large body of professors and students, in these many costly buildings, large libraries of rare volumes and spacious laboratories full of modern appliances. Well may your Eminence be elated that today there is united with the deeply felt recognition of educators in all parts of this country the thankfulness of hundreds of your men who have passed out from these portals with your approval upon them.

As was most fitting, Your Eminence and those associated with

you began the University with the founding of a School of Sacred Theology, for the education of priests is the highest education, since the ideal of the Christian priest is the most exalted, his vocation the most sublime, his office the most holy, his duties the most spiritual and his mission the most important and most sacred thing which can be assigned to a human being.

But the conquests of the mind in other realms of learning had produced a world-wide ferment of thought, an intellectual activity without a parallel in the world's history; they had increased the power of man to an almost incredible degree, had given him control of earth and seas, had placed within his grasp undreamed of forces, had opened to his view unsuspected mysteries, had placed him on a new earth and under new heavens, and thrown light never seen before upon the history of his race. As a part of this development new questions had arisen, new theories had been broached. For the study of these, for the making of new conquests, education was needed that would enlarge the intellect in new directions, and strengthen its faculties in new ways, so as to enable it to take connected views of new things and their relations, and to see clear amid the mazes of human errors and through the mists of human passion.

In order that the University might have its share in the imparting of this education, in the new conquest in many departments of learning, in the solution of innumerable problems, and in the building up of new theories, Your Eminence devoted great energy to the fuller development of the University in founding the lay faculties, although the heavy duties of your high ecclesiastical office taxed your strength already nearly to the utmost with spiritual and intellectual activities.

With joyful expectation, the lay faculties have looked forward to this day as a particularly fitting time to pay you homage, for none knew better than they how much Your Eminence has sacrificed for them and how lively and how constant has been your interest in them, and how much you have had at heart that they should have a very large share in the education of the youth of America, and in the widening of the yet narrow boundaries of human knowledge. They know with what clearness of spirit you have penetrated into all details and with what nobility of sentiment you have accomplished all the affairs of the University, with what fortitude you have met misfortunes and with how

great wisdom you have overcome them. And in the darkest days of the University, when it seemed that the work of the lay faculties must be ended, we know with what correctness of thought, with what openness of mind, with what flexibility of view, you took up against almost insurmountable opposition, the consideration and the formulation of plans that would forever guarantee the integrity of all the existing lay faculties, and make ready the way for new ones.

The world-wide and respectful recognition which the work of these lay faculties has received, indicates that their activities have not been without large success, and, under the stimulus of your cultivated intellect, your rich imagination, your eloquent expression, these faculties will continue to strive for the attainment of still greater successes in the acquisition of knowledge, in the imparting of knowledge, even though it may not be a means to wealth, or power, or any other common aim of life, to the end that we may have: judicious lawyers of wide mental culture and superior strength of character; men of letters who will produce literature that will elevate and refine the spirit of the whole people; philosophers with clear, calm, accurate comprehension of all things so far as the finite mind can embrace them; scientists who will regard the mind as the organ of truth, and train it for its own sake without reference to the exercise of a profession; engineers who will serve the highest purposes of the nation in the development of its vast natural resources. They will progress with religious zeal, high courage and strong endeavor, and imitating Columbus, who wrote in his journal day after day, those simple, but sublime words, "sailed westward today which is my course," they will write in their faculty records day after day, "progressed knowledgeward today which is our course," and like him give new knowledge to the world, and enlarge the boundaries of the scope of the earthly life.

It is of great interest to note that the inception of the University was almost coincident with the beginning of your priestly life, for it was in the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore that the establishment of the University received its first consideration. It is also of great interest to note that the actual establishment of the University was almost coincident with the beginning of your Cardinalate, so that your life as priest and as cardinal has been closely interwoven with that of the Uni-

versity, in the first part in the consideration of the needs and the possibilities of a university, in the second part, in the actual building of the University. Thus the jubilees which Your Eminence is about to celebrate are, in some measure, also jubilees of the University.

Our warmest thanks and the thanks of mankind are due you for the devotion which you have given in founding these lay faculties deep and firm. The latest evidence of that devotion we have in this splendid new hall for lay students of which the cornerstone has been laid today.

Our warmest wishes go with you into the new half century of your life as priest so rich already in great spiritual and intellectual accomplishments, into the new quarter century of your Cardinalate.

May many years be granted to you of spiritual and bodily freshness and vigor, so that Your Eminence may continue to be our guiding light in our efforts to attain the highest ideals of mankind.

In reply to these words of congratulation, His Eminence expressed his heartfelt thanks, his joy in the progress of the University and his confidence in its future. Continuing he said:

The Cardinal's Reply.

I cannot but recall today the first occasion on which a ceremony of this sort was performed in these grounds—when the cornerstone of the first building was laid as the rain fell in torrents from a sky which gave no promise of sunshine and the earth itself offered no suggestion of the edifices that now meet our view. What a pleasure by contrast it is to stand here this afternoon, for winter is now past, the rain is over and gone. Well may we exclaim: "Now is the winter of our discontent made glorious summer." The University, indeed, has had its days of wintry gloom, when misfortunes fell upon it fast and thick. Yet Almighty God has been pleased to preserve it through all adversity and even has turned to its advantage the evils which befell and the disasters which threatened it. Under the divine blessing the University now looks with courage and even with enthusiasm to

the coming years to the larger work that awaits it. Its inner life has been strengthened, its departments have multiplied, its faculties have grown in numbers and efficiency. It is even now under the happy necessity of providing a home for the students who, year by year, become more numerous. And I trust that this Hall may be followed in due time by other buildings to meet the demands created by the University's growth.

As the prosperity of the University, since the day of its foundation, has ever been uppermost in my thought and foremost in my endeavor, I rejoice exceedingly in its present good fortune and in its splendid prospect. I am in particular pleased to note that its efforts in behalf of our Catholic people, in behalf of our lay students, are winning appreciation; and I sincerely hope that we may soon be in a position to extend the facilities of the University to a much larger number.

But our first care must be to complete this Hall which already represents so much generosity and good-will on the part of the Catholics of this country. We owe it to them to make this a perfect work, a home in which our students may pursue, in safety and comfort, the courses of study for which their parents have sent them to the University. For their sake as well as for the sake of the University, I earnestly trust that all who hear me now or to whom my words may come, will do whatever they can towards completing this structure and thereby extending to greater numbers of our young men the benefits of Catholic education. In my own name and in the name of the Trustees, I desire again to thank all who have had a share in this noble undertaking and have afforded us so many reasons for pressing forward in our efforts for the cause of God and His Church.

MISCELLANEOUS.

The Summer School.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY.

The first session of the Summer School at the Catholic University was officially opened Sunday, July 2, and was closed Sunday, August 8. On both occasions all the members of the School attended Solemn High Mass, celebrated in the Chapel of Divinity College by the Rt. Rev. Rector, who also delivered an appropriate address. Lectures, laboratory work and other exercises began Monday, July 3, and continued, on five days of each week, until August 5. With the exception of a few courses given in Caldwell Hall, the work was conducted in McMahon Hall. The school day lasted from 8 a. m. to 6 p. m., with a recess of two hours at noon.

A list of instructors and a program of the courses were published in the June number of *The Catholic University Bulletin*. It was later found necessary to supply courses in Greek and these were given by Rev. George W. Hoey, S. S. An additional instructor in Latin was also secured, Rev. Benjamin F. Marcetteau, S. S. The total number of instructors was 24, including 6 lecturers who are not members of the University staff. The officers of the Summer School Faculty were: Rev. Thomas E. Shields, Ph. D., *Dean;* Rev. Edward A. Pace, Ph. D., *Vice-Dean;* Rev. Patrick J. McCormick, Ph. D., *Secretary;* Mr. Charles F. Borden, *Registrar*. In all, 36 courses were given: 32 of 25 lectures each, 3 of five lectures each, and 1 course of ten lectures—a total of 825 lectures. The laboratory exercises included 50 hours each in Physics, Chemistry and Biology. At the close of each course, a written examination was taken by students who desired academic credits counting for degrees. A series of evening lectures (illustrated) was given by Very Rev. A. P. Doyle, Superior of the Apostolic Mission House.

STUDENTS.

In accordance with the preliminary announcements, the School was open only to the teaching Sisterhoods and to women teachers in public or private schools. The total registration was 284; of this number 255 were religious, representing 23 orders or congregations; 29 were lay teachers. According to nationality: the United States had 274 representatives; Canada, 9, England, 1.

CLASSIFICATION OF STUDENTS.

Religious Orders (23)

Benedictines	36	Jesus-Mary	7
Blessed Sacrament	3	Loretto	4
Charity	11	Mercy	52
Charity of the B. V. M.	6	Missionary Helpers of Sacred Heart	4
Charity of the Incarnate Word	4	Notre Dame, Congregation of	2
Divine Providence	9	Providence	8
Dominicans	27	St. Francis	5
Gray Nuns of the Cross	6	St. Joseph	31
Holy Child	2	St. Mary	6
Holy Cross	9	Ursulines	6
Holy Names	8	*Lay Teachers*	29
Humility of Mary	2		
Immaculate Heart	7		

Dioceses (56)

Albany	7	Louisville	1
Alton	3	Manchester	1
Baker City	1	Mobile	4
Baltimore	46	Montreal	4
Boston	1	Nashville	2
Brooklyn	8	Newark	17
Buffalo	11	New Orleans	4

Chicago	4	New York	15
Cincinnati	4	Ogdensburg	2
Cleveland	6	Oklahoma	5
Concordia	4	Oregon City	2
Covington	5	Peoria	6
Dallas	3	Philadelphia	14
Davenport	2	Pittsburgh	4
Detroit	5	Providence	1
Dubuque	6	Quebec	3
Duluth	2	Richmond	4
Erie	6	St. Augustine	2
Fall River	1	St. Louis	7
Galveston	1	St. Paul	2
Harrisburg	8	San Antonio	8
Hartford	6	Scranton	4
Indianapolis	8	Toledo	2
Kansas City	2	Tucson	1
La Crosse	2	Westminster (Eng.)	1
Lead	2	Wheeling	3
Leavenworth	2	Wilmington	2
London, Ontario	2	Vic. Ap. North Carolina	5

States (31)

Alabama	4	New Jersey	17
Arizona	1	New York	43
Connecticut	6	North Carolina	5
District of Columbia	29	Oklahoma	5
Florida	2	Ohio	12
Illinois	13	Oregon	3
Indiana	8	Pennsylvania	36
Iowa	8	Rhode Island	1
Kansas	6	South Dakota	2
Kentucky	6	Tennessee	2
Louisiana	4	Texas	12
Maryland	17	Virginia	6
Massachusetts	2	West Virginia	3

Michigan	5	Wisconsin	2
Minnesota	4		
Missouri	9	Canada	9
New Hampshire	1	England	1

The religious were accommodated in Albert Hall, Caldwell Hall, St. Thomas' College and the Apostolic Mission House, on the grounds of the University in Trinity College, Holy Cross Academy, the Benedictine Convent, the Dominican Convent, Sacred Heart Academy, St. Catharine's, the Immaculata Seminary and Georgetown Convent. They were provided with every facility for the performance of their religious duties and of the exercises special to each community. The usual weekly devotions with Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament were held in the chapel of Divinity College.

Efficient assistance was rendered by the Welcome Committee of the National Catholic Woman's Circle who met the Sisters on their arrival and directed them to their respective places of residence. For courtesies extended in the way of transportation, acknowledgment is due the City and Surburban Line of the Washington Railway and Electric Company and the Mt. Vernon and Marshall Hall Steamboat Company.

Pleasant and instructive excursions were conducted for the sisters on the holidays. The Capitol, Library of Congress U. S. Treasury, Bureau of Engraving and Printing, were each visited and their features pointed our by efficient guides. On July 8, all enjoyed a delightful sail to Mount Vernon, where they were cordially received by the superintendent of the grounds who personally showed them over the historic site. The Sisters placed a beautiful wreath on the tomb of George Washington. July 13, President Taft received the entire student body at the White House, and greeted each sister and lay teacher individually. His Excellency, the Apostolic Delegate, Diomede Falconio, favored the School with his presence on the afternoon of Sunday, July 9. On this occasion the students congregated in the Chapel of Divinity Hall and listened to an inspiring address from the Delegate who afterward im-

parted the Apostolic Benediction. Benediction of the Most Blessed Sacrament followed, at which His Excellency presided. Tuesday, August 1, His Eminence, James Cardinal Gibbons, Chancellor of the University, visited the Summer School, and was tendered a reception by the professors and students. The Rt. Rev. Rector made the address of welcome to the Cardinal who responded with an enthusiastic discourse on the significance of the First Session of the University Summer School. At the close of the exercises each student was presented to the Cardinal.

PATRICK J. MCCORMICK,
Secretary.

New Appointments to the Teaching Staff.

In the School of Theology Rev. Dr. Franz Cöln has been appointed Instructor in the Old Testament. He will also conduct a class of exegesis in the New Testament. Dr. Cöln taught for several years in the ecclesiastical seminary at Trier. He is deeply versed in several Oriental languages, Hebrew, Syriac, Arabic, Coptic, and until recently was lecturer in Assyriology at the University of Bonn. For several years he edited the *"Oriens Christianus,"* one of the most learned of the special reviews devoted to Oriental languages and literature. Dr. Cöln is about forty years of age, and takes up his important work with unique and highly admirable preparation. The Catholic University has now three Orientalists of acknowledged reputation, the nucleus of an excellent school of Scripture studies.

In the School of Letters, Dr. Paul Gleis, a graduate of the University of Münster, has been appointed in German language and literature on the Anthony Walburg Chair. Dr. Gleis is a favorite disciple of Professor Jostes, professor of Germanics at Münster and a foremost authority on early German literature. Though a young man of only twenty-four Dr. Gleis has already won a reputation in the province of early medieval

German and allied studies. Apart from his extensive and accurate knowledge of modern German literature, he has made proficient studies in the oldest phases of the Arthurian sagas, and has already taken his place among the most successful investigators of the Parsifal and Merlin legends. His advent will be welcomed by all American Germanists.

In the School of Philosophy Dr. Thomas C. Carrigan, of Worcester, Mass., a graduate in Education of Clark University (1911), enters the Department of Education as Instructor in School Organization and Management. Dr. Carrigan is thirty-nine years of age, a graduate of Holy Cross College, Worcester, and of the Boston Law School, and for fourteen years practiced law with success in his native city. For several years he has devoted himself with ardor to educational studies and is the author of a unique and important work on educational legislation: "The Law and the American Child." This dissertation received the highest praise from Dr. G. Stanley Hall, President of Clark University, as a very brilliant, thorough and unique study of the child legislation of all the states in the union. Dr. Carrigan will also conduct courses in the School of Law, to be determined later according to the needs of the students.

In the School of Law Mr. Ammi Brown, A. M. (Harvard, 1902), has been appointed Instructor in Common Law and will act as secretary of the Law Faculty. Mr. Vincent Leroy Toomey, LL. B. (Catholic University, 1909), has also been appointed Instructor in Common Law. Dr. Thomas C. Carrigan will conduct two courses, one on the Law of Wills and the other on Law and the American Child. The teaching staff in the Law Faculty now consists of five professors and instructors who devote their entire time to the conduct of the School. A large number of students have entered the first year of the Law School.

In the School of Science Mr. Charles Lawler Kelly, A. B. (Clarke College, Worcester, 1909) has been appointed Instructor in Chemistry. Mr. John James Cantwell, B. S. (The Catholic University, 1911) has been appointed Instructor in Drawing. Mr. John Joseph Haley, C. E. (Tufts College,

1911), has been appointed Instructor in Civil Engineering. Mr. James Francis Connor, A. B. (Amherst College, 1900), and for several years instructor in Mathematics at the Boys' Latin School, Baltimore, has been appointed Instructor in Mathematics.

The teaching staff of the University now numbers fifty-eight, including instructors, student-assistants and fellows. Of these twenty-four are ecclesiastics, the other thirty-four are laymen.

The Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, Curantibus I. B. CHABOT, I. GUIDI, H. HYVERNAT.

The above is the title of an Oriental Patrology published by the Poussielgue firm of Paris under the joint direction of Drs. Chabot, Guidi, and Hyvernat, three scholars of international reputation in their respective fields. This vast publication, destined to complete the Greek and Latin Patrologies of Abbé Migne, will add a very large number of precious documents to our ecclesiastical literature and will be an important contribution to the history of the origin and growth of Christianity in Egypt, Syria, Persia and Mesopotamia.

The purpose of the editors of the Corpus is, for the present, to publish all Christian works extant in Syriac, Arabic, Ethiopic and Coptic; Armenian documents will be edited later. In order to make this literature accessible to students who are not familiar with Oriental languages all texts are translated into Latin; the original and the version are printed separately, each constituting one volume. According to the method and arrangement of this Patrology, each Oriental literature is divided into several series or groups. Syriac is distributed into four series: I. Apocrypha, Liturgy and Canons; II. Exegesis, Theology and Philosophy; III. History and Hagiography; IV. Documents of foreign origin, especially translations from the Greek. Ethiopic forms two groups: I. Apocrypha and Theology; II. History and Hagiography; and Coptic three: I. Apocrypha and Liturgy; II. Theology; III. History. The pro-

gramme of the Arabic section is not as yet definitely settled. Each series will be accompanied by a volume of indices and tables of contents.

Since 1903 the editors, assisted by collaborators in Europe and America, have published over thirty numbers from the four sections mentioned above. A complete list of them is given at the end of this notice. It is gratifying to remark that the work already done has won admiration and praise from many quarters; the volumes published have been reviewed very favorably and, last year, the French Academy of Inscriptions and Belles-Lettres bestowed upon Dr. Chabot, the editor-in-chief of the Corpus, its highest award, the Jean Reynaud prize, of the value of ten thousand francs, for his Oriental Patrology and his excellent contributions to Semitic epigraphy and literature.

The *Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium* is a tremendous undertaking and its importance cannot be overestimated. The editing and translating of this multitude of texts is of great value for Oriental philology. Many of these documents, now being brought to light for the first time, contain new words and new forms which will greatly enrich our Oriental vocabularies. All scholars know that Oriental dictionaries are far from being complete. We cannot speak of a Syriac or Coptic or Ethiopic lexicon in the sense we speak of a Latin or English Dictionary, for all Oriental dictionaries are based on the documents already published, and these are only a small fraction of those preserved in the libraries of Rome, Paris, London and Berlin, still waiting for some enterprising editor to give them to the public. Hence the lexicographer and the grammarian will reap an abundant harvest in the *Corpus*. Not only Oriental, but Greek philology as well, will be a gainer thereby. It is known for example that some Oriental works are translations of Greek originals now lost to us. Thus the *Theophany* of Eusebius of Cæsarea, of which only a few fragments remain in the Greek, has been preserved entire in a Syriac translation of the fourth or fifth century; the *Pistis Sophia*, a celebrated Gnostic work of the third century, exists only in Coptic, whilst the Arabic has

handed down to us the *Canones Hippolyti* (II Cent.) which are the most complete and explicit description of the institutions of the early Church. Again other Oriental works are translations from the Greek which appear to have been made during the lifetime of the Greek authors themselves. Such is the case with the *Discourses* of Titus of Bosra against the Manicheans and the writings of St. Cyril, St. Basil, St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Paul of Samosata, Theodore of Mopsuestia and many others. Hence Syriac versions of this kind are of great value for the correct interpretation of the original and should be taken into account in a critical edition of the Greek text.

In the different departments of ecclesiastical science, the *Corpus* will prove a veritable mine of useful information. Biblical studies will receive much assistance therefrom. It is not indeed the intention of the editors to publish the Oriental versions of the Bible; this does not fall within the scope of a Patrology. But, although we have editions of the Scriptures in most of the Oriental languages, we have no complete critical edition of any one of them, in the sense that we have editions of the Massoretic text or the Septuagint. Thus there is no critical edition of the Syriac *Peshitta* as a whole. For this a great deal of preliminary work is necessary, of which much remains to be done; examination of ancient Syriac Biblical mss., collection of variant readings, and comparison of the Syriac text with the Hebrew and Greek originals. This preliminary study will be furthered in part by the publication of the writings of the Syriac Fathers. Their theological works abound in Scriptural quotations, and although they often quoted from memory, they must surely have had copies of the Biblical text as it existed in their day. The copying of the Bible was an important part of the curriculum of studies in the great Syrian schools, and we read in the Acts of the Council of Seleucia (410) that candidates to subdeaconship were required to know the entire Psalter by heart. Hence the numerous Scriptural quotations scattered here and there in the writings of the Syrians, by giving us an idea of the text current in

their time, will be of some help towards a critical edition of the whole *Peshitta* which still remains a desideratum. Again the Biblical student will find most interesting information in the Scripture commentaries so numerous in Syriac literature. There is hardly a Syrian scholar of note that has not left some explanation of one or more books of the Bible, and it is in this province of sacred science that the Syrians have done some of their most original work. Their interpretation of Holy Writ is logical, sober and literal, and reflects the best traditions of the school of Antioch.

The student of the history of Philosophy cannot afford to ignore Oriental literature. True he must not expect to find among Oriental scholars complete treatises after the manner of the Scholastics, but he will not fail to notice that the West is, to a large extent, indebted to the East, especially to the Syrians, for its knowledge of the works of Aristotle. The influence of Aristotelian philosophy in Syria dates from the beginning of the fifth century when the spread of Nestorian doctrines had made a knowledge of Greek absolutely necessary. The Isagoge and the Analytics, in fact most of the treatises known under the name of Organum, were translated at an early period. After the destruction of the Persian school of Edessa by order of the Emperor Zeno in 489, the study of the philosophy of Aristotle was cultivated by both the Jacobites and Nestorians. Among the Jacobites we may mention Sergius of Reschaina (536), Severus Sebokt (VII Cent.), James of Edessa (708), and George, bishop of the Arabs (724): among the Nestorians Henanisho I (701), Mar Aba II (751), and the numerous scholars and physicians who lived at the court of the Abbassides in Bagdad during the ninth and tenth centuries. The Nestorians initiated the Arabs to the philosophy of Aristotle and translated it for them from the Syriac into Arabic. The Arabs proved very apt pupils; in fact they soon surpassed their masters themselves, and, after having made Aristotelian philosophy their own, introduced it to the scholars of the Middle Ages. Familiarity with the philosophy of Aristotle as understood by the Orientals will help us to form a just and correct estimate

of their theology. We know that after the Council of Chalcedon only a few of them remained attached to the Church of Rome; the great majority of them became Monophysites or Nestorians. Both factions have left us a considerable number of dogmatic texts: symbols, professions of faith, treatises on the Incarnation and on the union of the divinity with the humanity. But they modified considerably the opinions of the Greek heretics. Thus the Oriental Monophysites differ much from the Eutychians. Although they teach one nature, one hypostasis and one person in Christ, they insist very strongly on the reality of the humanity and its consubstantiality with ours, and hold that the divinity and the humanity are united into one composite nature somewhat after the union of the body and the soul in man. Strange as it may seem they anathematize alike Eutyches, Nestorius, and the followers of the Council of Chalcedon: Eutyches for teaching the commingling of the two natures or the absorption of the humanity into the divinity; Nestorius for dividing Christ and speaking of two natures and two hypostases, and the adherents of Chalcedon for what they call their inconsistency in not admitting two hypostases as well as two natures after the union. The Nestorians, on the contrary, teach two natures, two hypostases, and one person or *parsopa* in Christ. They have written numerous treatises on the meaning they attach to these terms, and their theology on the Incarnation will help us to understand better the teachings of Nestorius which, since the publication of Loofs' Nestoriana and Bedjan's Bazaar of Heraclides, have aroused fresh controversy.

If we now pass to the domain of History and Hagiography, much can be learned from Oriental literature. The humble chroniclers of the East, though less pretentious than their Greek predecessors and models, deserve their share of praise for the diligence with which they have preserved to us many precious documents. Among the Syrians we may mention the anonymous author of the Chronicle of Edessa compiled from the archives of the city and other records which are now lost; Josue the Stylite who has left us the best account of the great war between the Persian and Byzantine empires (505-

506); Denis of Tell-Mahre who has given us a translation of the second part of the *Chronicon* of Eusebius of Cæsarea, and Bar Hebreus whose Universal History contains much valuable information on the Patriarchs of Antioch, and, after the time of Severus, on the Patriarchs of the Monophysite branch of the Church of Antioch down to the year 1285. Armenian literature also is very rich in historical material. It boasts more than fifty chroniclers and compilers. Among the native historians we may notice Goriun (IV cent.) author of a life of Mesrob, the founder of Armenian literature; Moses of Khorene (IV cent.) who wrote a history of Armenia in four books, three of which have come down to us covering the period from the origins of his nation to the death of Isaac the Great; Lazarus of Pharbe (VI cent.) who has left a history of Armenia from the time of its partition between the Persians and the Romans to the year 485, and the Catholicos John VI (925) who continued the work of his predecessors to the beginning of the tenth century. All these writers give us much information concerning the various fortunes of Armenia which was the battle ground of the Roman and Persian armies in the fifth century and later on of the Arabs and the Mongols.

Next to history proper Hagiography will profit greatly by the *Corpus Scriptorum*. Syriac, Ethiopic, and Coptic literatures are exceedingly rich in works containing lives of the saints or passions of martyrs. The numerous passions that we have in Syriac, for example, throw much light on the conditions of the Persian Church under the reign of Sapor II who for forty years (439-479) persecuted the Christians in many districts of his vast empire. They supply us with important data concerning the wars between the Romans and the Persians, and with notices which enable us, in numbers of cases, to verify, correct, and complete, the episcopal lists of eastern dioceses, and to fix definitely the site of some ancient cities. Thus we are able in part to supplement the history of Sozomen, who, alone of all the Greek historians, relates the persecution of Sapor, during which about 15,000 martyrs, of every rank and condition of life, gave up their blood in defence of the faith.

Liturgical studies will glean interesting information from the *Corpus*. No country is richer than the Orient in this respect. Thus the Jacobites who adopted the liturgy of St. James possess more than fifty varieties of it, differing in this from the Nestorians who generally use that of SS. Adaeus and Maris. The Copts follow the ancient Alexandrine liturgy, while the Armenians have that of St. Basil. The publication of these liturgical texts will place in a clearer light the constant belief of the Egyptian and Eastern Churches in the dogma of the Transubstantiation and of the Real Presence, and the many rites and ceremonies connected with the reception of the Holy Eucharist.

The preceding considerations are enough to show the importance of this Oriental Patrology. To judge from the volumes already published the editors are deserving of great praise for the colossal task they have undertaken. But a work of such a magnitude cannot thrive merely on moral support; some financial assistance is necessary. Although the editors and collaborators are giving their services gratuitously, the expenses of publication are very considerable, including not only the cost of printing, but also the photographing or copying of a large number of manuscripts. Hence all scholars interested in Semitic languages or in ecclesiastical literature should help at least by subscribing for the whole or a part of the Patrology. The subscription price is very reasonable, being at the rate of 20 cents for 16 pages of oriental text and 14 cents for 16 pages of Latin translation. With such support the editors would be able to carry on this publication more rapidly. And why should not some Catholic Mæcenas arise and further by his generosity a work so auspiciously begun? Protestants give large sums of money for exploration purposes in Bible lands and Catholics contribute freely to schools, hospitals, and missions. Is not a publication of this kind of as great importance and interest as excavations in Babylonia and Assyria? Are not the Christian texts that tell us of the piety of the solitaries of the desert, of the sufferings of the martyrs in times of persecution, and of the civilizing mission of the Church in eastern lands, more precious to us than the papyri of Egypt or the cuneiform

inscriptions of Nippur and Niniveh? Catholics should remember that this Oriental Christian literature is especially their own; it is a part of their literary heritage no less than the writings of the Greek and Latin Fathers. They should cherish it and rescue it from oblivion, for no document that throws any light on the origin and spread of Christianity can be a matter of indifference to them. May the editors of the *Corpus* therefore receive all the help and encouragement to which they are entitled! They are doing a noble work for science and the Catholic Church.

The following is a complete list of the works published in the *Corpus* from 1903 to 1910. Each *tome* consists of two volumes, one of text, the other of Latin translation. One may subscribe for the whole Patrology or any one section of it, or may buy one volume separately.

Syriac.

Series II, t. XCIII. Denis bar Salibi (xii cent.): Explanation of the Liturgy; text and translation by J. Labourt.

Series II, t. XCVIII. Denis bar Salibi: Commentary on the Gospels; text and translation by I. Sedlacek.

Series II, t. CI. Denis bar Salibi: Commentary on the Apocalypse, the Acts of the Apostles and the Catholic Epistles; text and translation by I. Sedlacek.

Series II, t. LXIV. The Letters of the Catholicos Ishoyabh III (vii cent.); text and translation by Rubens Duval.

Series II, t. XXVII. Philoxenus of Mabbogh (v and vi cent.): Treatises on the Trinity and the Incarnation; text and translation by A. Vaschalde.

Series II, t. XXXVII. Documents bearing on the origin of the Monophysites; text by J. B. Chabot; translation in the press.

Series II, t. LXV. Theodorus bar Koni (vii cent.): The Book of Scholia; text by Addai Scher; translation in the press.

Series III, t. IV. The Lesser Chronicles; three fascicles; text and translation by I. Guidi, J. B. Chabot, and E. W. Brooks.

Series III, t. VII and VIII. Elias of Nisibis (xi cent.): Opus Chronologicum; text and translation by J. B. Chabot and E. W. Brooks.

Series III, t. XXI. Fascicle I: Lives of illustrious Monophysites: text and translation by E. W. Brooks.

Ethiopic.

Series I, t. VIII. Fascicle I: Apocrypha concerning the Blessed Virgin Mary: text and transation by M. Chaine.

Series I, t. XXXI. Abyssinian Philosophers; text and translation by E. Littmann.

Series II, t. III. History of King Sarsa Dengel; text and translation by K. Conti Rossini.

Series II, t. V. Fascicle I: The Annals of King John I; fascicle II; The Annals of Kings Iyasu I and Bakaffa; text and translation by I. Guidi.

Series II, t. VI. The Annals of Iyasu II and Ioyas; text and translation by I. Guidi.

Series II, t. VIII. Documents bearing on Ethiopic History, fascicle I; text and translation by K. Conti Rossini.

Series II, t. XVII. Fascicle I: The Acta of SS. Yared and Pantalewon; text and translation by K. Conti Rossini.

Series II, t. XX. Fascicle I: The Acta of SS. Basalota Mikael and Anorewos; text and translation by K. Conti Rossini. Fascicle II; The Acta of SS. Aaron and Philip; text and translation by B. Turaiev.

Series II, t. XXI. Fascicle I: The Acta of S. Eustathius; text and translation by B. Turaiev.

Series II, t. XXII. Fascicle I: The Acta of S. Mercurius; text and translation by K. Conti Rossini.

Series II, t. XXIII. Fascicle I: The Acta of SS. Fere-Mikael and Zara-Abraham; text and translation by B. Turaiev.

Series II, t. XXIV. Fascicle I: The Acta of SS. Abakerazun and Hawarayat; text and translation by K. Conti Rossini.

Series II, t. XXVIII. Acta Martyrum; text and translation by E. Pereira.

Coptic.

Series II, t. II. Fascicle I: The Life and Works of Sinuthius; text by John Leipoldt and W. Crum.

Series II, t. IV. The Life and Works of Sinuthius; fascicle III; text by Leipoldt and W. Crum.

Series III, t. II. Acta Martyrum; text and translation by J. Balestri and H. Hyvernat.

Arabic.

Series III. t. I. Peter Ibn Rahib: Oriental Chronicle; text and translation by L. Cheikho.

Series III, t. VI. Annals of Eutychius, patriarch of Alexandria; part I, text by L. Cheikho.

Series III, t. VII. Annals of Eutychius, patriarch of Alexandria; part II, text by L. Cheikho, Carra de Vaux, and Zayyat.

Series III, t. IX. Severus ben el Moqaffa: fascicles I and II; text by C. Seybold.

Series III, t. XVIII. Synaxarium Alexandrinum: fascicles I, II, and III; text by J. Forget.

A. A. VASCHALDE.

BOOK REVIEWS.

Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi Catholique, sous la Direction de A. D'Alès. Fascicule VI, Evangiles-Fin du Monde. Paris, Beauchesne, 1911.

The successive numbers of the new *Apologetic Dictionary of the Catholic Faith* are appearing with great promptness. Part VI is a worthy continuation of the excellent portions that have previously been published. By far the most prominent article is the treatise by Abbé Lepin on the *Canonical Gospels.* It comprises the last pages of the preceding fascicle and about one-half of the present number. At first sight one is inclined to object to its great length, for if printed in large type it would make a fair-sized volume. But this objection is soon forgotten when one examines the contents and sees the great amount of scholarly information presented to the reader and made easily accessible by orderly arrangement and by a conspicuous division into sections and numbers. Conservative to a marked degree, the treatise gives evidence of a vast amount of careful reading, and offers a comprehensive view of the great questions of the authenticity and genuinenes of the Gospels, particularly of that of St. John, the integrity of the texts, the relations to one another of the Synoptics, and the historical value of all four. As the author proceeds from point to point, he notes the different views and theories of the rationalists, and makes abundant reference to modern writings bearing on each subject. It is a valuable guide for the study of the credibility of the Gospels.

Other important and lengthy articles in this fascicle are that on *Bishops* by Canon Michiels, who gives therein a clear summary of his book, *l'Origine de l'Episcopat;* that on the *Evolutionary Theory of Morals* by Abbé Bruneteau, in which the weaknesses and untoward consequences of the theory are mercilessly exposed; the erudite article of Father Durand, S. J., on *Exegesis;* that on *Religious Experience,* in which the author, Father Pinard, S. J., makes a careful estimate of the value of this element of religious life, at the same time criticizing the theories of W. James, H.

Bergson, and others; the article of M. Taudière on the *Family,* in which this important subject is treated first from the philosophic and social, and then from the historic, point of view. In the latter portion, chief stress is laid on French legislation.

There are, besides, a number of interesting short articles, such as Abbé Griet's criticism of Bergson's *Creative Evolution*; the Abbé Besson's articles on *Exemption of Regulars,* and on *Therapeutic Feticide;* the all too short article on *Extreme Unction,* by Father de Guibert, S. J., and the fine account of *Fetishism* by Bishop Le Roy.

CHARLES F. AIKEN.

Introduction de la Messe Romaine en France sous les Carolingiens. Par L'Abbé H. Netzer. Paris, Alphonse Picard et Fils. 1910. 8°, pp. vi + 366.

No more timely and necessary study in the history of the Mediæval Liturgy could be undertaken than that of recounting the conditions and reasons which led to the supersession of the Gallican by the Roman Liturgy in the Carolingian Empire. The subject has many elements of attractiveness outside of the general interest attaching to liturgical changes and rivalries which led to the comparative unity in liturgical observances of the present time. The author has been at pains to detail as far as possible the extent to which the Gallican Liturgy was observed and the causes which led to its removal as well as in describing what this primitive liturgy was. A chapter is devoted to the great liturgiologists of the ninth century, Alcuin, Amalarius, Agobard, Florus of Lyons, Walafrid Strabo and others, who under the reforming impulse given by Charlemagne contributed so much to unity of observance in liturgical matters, and to the elucidation and illustration of liturgical customs. The work of the present author is especially valuable because of the wealth of old texts which it contains, and which are made available here in a manner not found elsewhere. The Abbé Netzer has made a valuable contribution to an interesting and difficult subject.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Enchiridion Fontium Historiae Ecclesiasticae Antiquae, quod in usum Scholarum collegit Conradus Kirch, S. J. Freiburg, Herder, 1910. 8°, pp. xxix + 636.

It would be impossible to make any collection of texts or sources which could meet with the approval and satisfy the needs of students in general. Much discretion and good judgment have been shown in the selection of the texts which make up this volume. It is primarily intended for students of Church history who have no adequate library at their disposal, and who wish to become acquainted at first hand with the evidence in regard to the early Church. The excerpts from ancient authors are arranged chronologically and deal with the principal topics of Church history, with early Christian missions, the hierarchy, Christian doctrine, persecutions, heresies and schisms, sacraments, liturgy, etc., and the relations of Church and State. In addition to the extracts from the writings of the ancient authors, there are quoted a number of official documents, acts of councils, rescripts and decrees of Emperors, together with specimens of inscriptions, Acta Martyrum, and passages from the papyrus remains. The extracts cover the first seven centuries. Even for students who have access to large libraries the work will be a useful desk-volume, containing, as it does many documents which are scattered through innumerable volumes as *v. g.*, the extracts from the pagan authors, the Muratorian fragment, etc. A system of cross references by means of marginal numbers makes it easy to find texts bearing on the same subject.

PATRICK J. HEALY.

The Dawn of Modern England, being a History of the Reformation in England (1509-1525). By Carlos B. Lumsden, Barrister-at-Law. Longmans, Green and Co. New York, 1910. 8°, pp. 303.

The main thesis of this work is not new: but its elaboration at the hands of the present author, and its application in concrete to the England of Henry VIII, are both suggestive and valuable. Instead of viewing the Reformation in the traditional manner

as being primarily a religious revolt, Mr. Lumsden assumes that the religious upheaval was but one phase of a wider and a more significant movement. His purpose was "to see if there was not some thing common in the practically simultaneous revolutions in religion, in learning, in law and in social economy that convulsed Europe in the later fifteenth and early years of the sixteenth centuries." The common cause, and common source of all these movements he finds to have been an economic one. Following the lead of Mr. Belford Box he concludes that: "the true inwardness of the change of which the Protestant Reformation represented the ideological side, meant the transformation of society from a basis mainly corporative and co-operative to one individualistic in its essential character." Even for those who are not prepared to follow the author in his attempt to apply the principles of the economic interpretation of history to the Reformation, there is much in this book that is of more than passing interest. One point of the most vital importance which is clearly brought out is the comparison between mediæval and modern civilization, showing the difference between the consciousness of social responsibility which marked the Middle Ages and the unrestrained individualism of the present. This idea enables the author to establish the connection between the social problems of the present and the changes inaugurated by the Reformation. "The battle that was fought in England and in Europe, and which we call the Reformation, was no dead and dull battle over mere theology, or over mere items of passing interest, but was a battle which with altered characters and with slightly different watch-words, is being refought in our own times and in our own land." In concrete the author reduces the struggle in the Middle Ages to a conflict for the possession of capital. He scouts the idea that the Reformation was merely an uprising of the people against the godless tyranny of Rome." One fact of supreme importance which stands out clearly in the early pages of the work is the wide cleavage between the mediæval and the modern concepts of property. To this difference rooted in the extreme individualism of the present can be traced most modern social complications. A weakness in the book is that the author when dealing expressly with English conditions fails frequently to connect what he describes with his general assumption that these conditions arose from economic causes. An excellent bibliography is appended to the work. In a

book showing such wide reading and erudition one would hardly expect split infinitives (p. 26), nor careless proof-reading. *Fontarina* for *Fornarina* (p. 22).

PATRICK J. HEALY.

Les Caisses d'Épargne, par M. F. Lepelletier, Professeur d'Economie Politique à la Faculté libre droit de Paris. Librairie, Victor Lecoffre. J. Gabalda et Cie, rue Bonaparte 90. Paris, 1911. 243 pp.

At the present moment, while the U. S. Postal Savings Bank is being put to the test in the field of public service, American readers will, no doubt welcome the little volume which appears under the title: "Les Caisses d'Épargne."

Without burdening the reader with tiresome details, the work presents a fairly complete history of legislation in the matter of savings banks, both public and private, in all the principal saving nations, together with a critical analysis of the various systems and a general comparison of their methods and achievements. Addressing himself primarily to French readers, and in their own language, the author naturally devotes the major part of his attention to a consideration of the French systems. However, his patriotism does not prevent him from pointing out the weaknesses of the French policy, as he sees them, nor from giving due credit to the excellence of foreign systems.

Besides those of France, the savings bank systems of England, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Holland, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, United States and Italy are examined in the order named, being grouped according to the greater or less freedom they enjoy in their operations, particularly in the employment of their funds.

The author quotes freely from official statistics, and pursues a uniformity of method in the prosecution of his analyses and in the presentation of his data, which renders it easy to compare the various national policies. In this consists, perhaps, the greatest value of the work.

Throughout the volume prominence is given to the fact that savings banks properly so called, are destined primarily for the service of those who have but small sums to invest. Hence the author although realizing that it costs something to receive and

handle these small sums especially in sparsely settled districts, advocates giving to the banks all the latitude that is consistent with safety, in order that the man of small means may receive an adequate return from his investment. Fault is found with some legislative bodies, among them the French, which hamper the operations of their savings banks in an over-zealous effort to render them safe.

The volume is full of useful information, although it is to be regretted that more attention is not given to American conditions. The author is silent concerning the U. S. Postal Savings Bank; still those who wish to come to an intelligent understanding of its aims and possibilities will do well to read his work.

M. Lepelletier is a professor in the Catholic Institute of Paris and Secretary-General of the Société d'Économie Sociale.

M. F. McEvoy.

The Basis of Ascendancy. By Edgar Gardner Murphy. Longmans, Green and Co. New York, 1909. 250 pp.

"Starting with the fact that the negro is a negro and that his capacities upon the average are not the capacities of the white man, what shall be the policy of the state toward the capacities he has." This, as he tells us himself, is the perplexing question which the author sets himself to answer.

Whether he has succeeded or not, his contribution is evidently the offering of one who has been in intimate contact with the problem. In refreshing contrast to the heated utterances of some who approach the question, he manifests a temperate well-balanced sympathy with the negro, together with a certain depth of insight into the psychology of both races, black and white, which bespeaks a knowledge gained by both study and experience.

The work is one of a series being a general discussion of problems to be treated more specifically in a volume to follow or which have received some attention in a previous volume, "The New South."

The theme is undoubtedly interesting and the author's treatment of it worthy of consideration, but his manner of presentation leaves something to be desired. In his efforts to escape the

commonplace in expression he is often betrayed into an obscurity of style which is most distracting to the reader.

However, the work is a sober, earnest attempt to solve a vexing problem and offers information and suggestions well calculated to stimulate fruitful thought.

M. F. McEvoy.

Lessons in Logic, by William Turner, S. T. D., Professor of Philosophy in the Catholic University of America; Washington, D. C. Catholic Educational Press; London, R. and T. Washbourne; 1911; pp. 302. Price, $1.25.

There has been in Catholic educational institutions a long felt need of philosophical text-books which could be used without having to warn the student against false or questionable suppositions and implications. All branches of philosophy are intimately connected, and their dependence on one another is such that, however fair and objective an author may endeavor to be, his treatment of a special question is unavoidably colored by his views concerning other problems. It frequently happens even that insinuations are more dangerous than explicit statements because, being only accessory, less attention is paid to them. They are accepted as true at first sight because the statements, facts, rules, etc., along with which they are presented and to which they seem indissolubly bound are certainly true. This applies especially to logic which is so closely related to the fundamental problems of the nature and value of knowledge that the solution given to these problems cannot fail to make its influence felt throughout. There is an undercurrent which at times manifests itself at the surface.

Hence Doctor Turner's *Lessons in Logic*—the first volume of the Catholic University Series of Text-books in Philosophy—will be welcomed, and the other volumes of the same series will be eagerly awaited. One cannot expect to find much that is new in a text-book on logic. Dr. Turner's *Lessons,* while strictly adhering to traditional philosophy, are an ample proof that, in this instance, scholastic principles adapt themselves most harmoniously to the results of modern research in logic and methodology, and that, in their essentials, they fit in perfectly with more recent progress.

Clearness, which is one of the most important qualities required in a text-book, is a prominent feature of this. Avoiding the extremes of a diffuse exposition and of an algebraic conciseness, Dr. Turner states the rules clearly, with precision, and illustrates them by examples that are taken chiefly from concrete, even from every day life, and that, in consequence, will appeal to the student's mind. It may safely be said that if a student fails to become interested in logic as presented in these lessons, or if he finds himself unable to understand and master it, little if any profit will be derived from the substitution of another text-book.

C. A. Dubray.

The Story of Our Lord's Life told for Children, by a Carmelite Nun. New York, Cathedral Library Association, 1910. Pp. xii + 173.

"The Story of Our Lord's Life, told for Children," by a Carmelite nun, makes an interesting addition to the list of good books for the little ones. It is simply and beautifully told and the scriptural phraseology is preserved wherever it is possible. The scriptural passages form the ground work and the story is merely the explanation or commentary to suit the child's mind. The book is especially attractive because of its many well-chosen pictures which are selected from the great masterpieces dealing with Our Lord's Life. It should prove very helpful to Sunday-school teachers if used as supplementary work, because the book would appeal strongly to children. It fully succeeds in the aim expressed in the introduction to satisfy the child's natural love of the marvellous, the beautiful, and the true, by a personal knowledge of the life of Our Lord and His Blessed Mother.

NECROLOGY.

Judge William C. Robinson.

Judge William C. Robinson, Dean of the Law School of the Catholic University of America died at his home in Washington on Monday, November 6, 1911.

Born in Norwich, Conn., on July 26, 1834, he received his early education in the private schools there and at Wesleyan Academy. He graduated from Dartmouth College in 1854 with the degree of A. B. He received the degree of doctor of law from Dartmouth in 1879, and his master of arts degree from Yale in 1881.

Eleven years after he was graduated from Dartmouth College Professor Robinson practiced law in New Haven, at the same time lecturing in the university. He was judge of the city court of New Haven from 1869 to 1871, afterward being appointed judge of the court of common pleas of Connecticut. He served in this capacity until he came to Washington.

Professor Robinson was a lecturer of law in Yale University from 1869 to 1872, and a professor of common law in the same institution from 1872 until 1896. A tablet was unveiled to his memory at the commencement exercises in June, 1909, at which President Taft was present.

Professor Robinson's "Elementary Law" is considered the standard book of its kind in publication today, and is used in all the law schools of the country, having been sanctioned by the Association of American Law Schools and Universities.

His other celebrated works are "Life of Ebenezer Beriah Kelly," "Notes of Elementary Law," "Elementary Law," "Clavis Rerum," "Law of Patents," in three volumes; "Forensic Oratory," and "Elements of American Jurisprudence." He was a contributor to the leading legal periodicals from 1867 to 1910, and was editor of the Mirror of Justice in 1903.

He wrote many legal essays, and was considered an authority on patent law, sending one of his pupils into the Orient to revise the patent law of Japan. For this he was signally honored by the Japanese government.

At ten o'clock on Wednesday, November 8, a solemn High Mass of Requiem was celebrated in St. Joseph's Church, Washington, D. C. at which the celebrant was the Right Reverend Thomas J. Shahan, Rector of the University, and the preacher, the Reverend Dr. John T. Creagh, Professor of Canon Law. After the ceremony the remains, accompanied by the Law students of the University, were conveyed to the Union Station. The interment took place at Norwich, Conn.

The following is the text of the tribute paid to Judge Robinson by Reverend Dr. Creagh at the funeral services:

It is not easy, on such short notice, and in these solemn and moving circumstances, to pay fittingly a brief, final tribute of respect, in the name of a great school, to one who labored long and lovingly and with distinction in its service; and the difficulty becomes still greater when this tribute is to voice not only the common knowledge of a noble character in the presence of which all men must feel humbled, but also a sincere friendship which developed with increasing intimacy into admiration. The record left by Judge Robinson is an unusual one and worthy of a more adequate appreciation than that which, in honor of his memory and for our own good, after only a few hours' preparation, I now attempt.

Men are great not by virtue of their place, their material possessions or their intellectual gifts, but because of noble qualities of mind and heart, and of services rendered to worthy causes. Only the good servant of his fellow-man, of society, of the Church; only he who speaks by life and word a message of progress or of solace, and contributes to the betterment of humanity in some of its many fields of endeavor; only he of whom it can be said that the world is better for his having lived; only such are worthy to be rescued from the oblivion in which death enshrouds the great majority of our race and recalled to the memory of the living for purposes of encouragement and inspiration.

In the light of this standard, we assist today at the obsequies

of a great-souled man, whose achievements are worthy of commemoration. God blessed our departed friend with length of days, with strength of body, a brilliant intellect, and particularly with that steadfast purpose and stalwart energy that have enabled the sturdy New England stock from which he sprang to contribute so forcefully to the political and religious institutions of our country. All that he was and all that he had, all through his long life which stretched over more than the scriptural span, from 1834 to two days ago, he gave freely and generously to things high and holy. He was always active in good causes. He ever held himself ready to respond to the call of broader, more serviceable effort, and—the true test of a great soul—he recked not of personal cost or sacrifice. And throughout all his days, he bore "the white rose of a blameless life;" of him it can be truly said, "he kept the paths of justice and guarded the ways of the saints."

Opportunities came to put his nobility of soul to the test. We, who witnessed his daily coming and going, know how like a true man he bore himself in the stress of daily strife, so that to know him was to learn again the highest possibilities of Christian character and the wonderful power of lay example, and to see inborn honor and candor and uprightness wrought to perfection under the fruitful influence of divine grace. Perhaps it is by these ordinary tests that character is best revealed.

But more notable opportunities for test and for service were his. And one of these, to which, arduous as it was, he fully measured up, which gives us our best insight into his character as a Christian and into his title to remembrance in his chosen field of work, came when the authorities of the Catholic University of America in 1895 determined to organize a school for the teaching of legal science and chose him to be its founder.

At that time Dr. Robinson had been a professor of common law for twenty-six years at Yale University. His success as a teacher, which was of the highest; his standing in the community, which had honored him with appointments to various judgeships and to the State Legislature; his popularity with the students, whose affection for him was traditional; his attachment to a school which he had watched and helped grow from insignificance to national importance; everything of reality in his past and present, and everything of hope in his future bound him to his surroundings, and especially forbade such a breaking of social and familiar ties

and such an annihilation of sure material prospects as were implied in this new venture, which as yet existed only in the minds of its originators.

His choice, however, was not long in the making. With the same resolution and the same spirit of sacrifice that had enabled him years before to abandon the Episcopal ministry and enter the Catholic Church as a layman, he now buoyantly and gladly cut himself off from his past and all its promise and undertook, for the good of humanity and of the Church, a work which might very properly be styled a creation.

No event so helps us to a clear understanding of the principal motives of his life as does this courageous undertaking. His comprehensive mind fully grasped the possibilities of the situation—untold possibilities of social beneficence and political security—and to the realization of these possibilities, after an heroic act of faith in God, he feared not to devote, even at the risk of loss, his reputation, his ability, his future. A small soul can not appreciate either the meaning or the merit of his sacrifice; a poor soul can not grasp the lofty purpose that sustained him to the day of his death and that he executed so well that those who come after him have only to continue to build on the sure, well-planned foundation which he laid.

In the University Law School we have his view of law, which was grand and high, worthy of a Papinian or a Paulus. He knew that law is the life of the State, that in it are infallibly reflected the elevation or debasement of popular judgment, and that fluctuations of the moral temperature of the body-politic are sooner or later registered in the code; that in a country like ours lawyers and judges are able to play a most important part in creating jurisprudence, and our lawmakers themselves are frequently men of legal formation. He knew also that a strong, just juristic sense, carefully trained and developed, can build up a body of legal principles that can prevail over popular passion, conquer conquering armies, and survive the social organizations which they were originally intended to govern.

In his mind, then, legal education must not be the mere assembling of large groups of students to learn how to win cases and gain a livelihood. That there will always be one class of students who have no higher view of their calling, Dr. Robinson was well aware, and he understood that in his school, as in every law-school,

provision must be made for them. But in his concept law was to be more than an art; it was to be what it had ever been in the minds of the great masters of Roman and Common Law, a science; not a mere scaffolding of precedents, but a noble, immortal structure of principles from which men should go out with their vision of justice clarified; knowing cases and statutes, but cognizant also of the great, controlling sources from which all just legislation flows; skilled in the mysteries of the soul as well as of the body of jurisprudence; ready, therefore, when need arose—as arise it surely will—to render service to ethics and religion and government as well as to law.

He was equipped as perhaps no other man in our country to execute this far-reaching design. He had a long and varied experience in teaching and in practice; he had assisted in the formation of generations of students; he was familiar with the general characteristics of legal education in the United States and in other countries. But,—more important for the successful carrying out of the work to which he had set his hand—he not only could analyze existing systems and point out their defects, he was a builder with plans and materials ready for a new and more imposing construction. He saw clearly the majesty of the Roman Law reaching out over nations and continents in unwearying dominion and sensed in its ever-applicable axioms a great, efficient, formative instrument; he realized moreover that to it men will continually turn more and more as to a common source of municipal and international law; he knew that the Canon Law had given system and form to the undigested customs which were the forerunners of the common law of England and the United States, and still spoke through many a detail of current statute and practice: he loved to proclaim the dependence of all human enactments on the law of God: and with him it was as an article of faith that all sciences, including law and sociology and politics and economics, were intimately related to ethics and religion and could not rightly be divorced from them. For him law was a sacred thing, *ars boni et aequi*, deriving its essence as well as its name from *iustitia*.

Thus enlightened, he clearly comprehended what could be accomplished for lawyers and the law, and through them for our social morality and civic security, by the utilization of every good agency, especially in a new school, untrammelled by traditions and devoted to all that was highest and best in every field of science.

In his law school, to the development of which he brought the rich requirements of many years and devoted his days and nights until the final call came, we behold not only the expression of his character and ability, but also his real monument. *Defunctus adhuc loquitur.* His masterly mind will still speak through its noble lines to those who come after him, proclaiming that God blessed the sacrifice in which the first stones were laid, that the work was well begun and well done, and all that remains is to maintain it as his wise counsels planned it.

In his own department as a professor of Common Law, Dr. Robinson was unrivalled. His eloquence, his special gift of clear and logical expression, his ability to invest with interest the most uninviting subjects, his experience as teacher, lawyer and judge, his wide knowledge of the legal literature of all departments and all lands, his readiness to serve and help, his well-known uprightness, contributed to win him a popularity which will cause the news of his death to bring sadness wherever men do the work of the law from Maine to California. Even his books, which of course lack the charm of his personality, bear evidence to his command of an unusual excellence of style, and a lucidity of statement which might well serve as a model.

His work, however, in behalf of the University was not limited to establishing and developing the School of Law, of which he was Dean. No one loved the University more, no one sacrificed more of time and labor for its general interests. He may justly be styled one of its founders. From the time he came to Washington to the very day before his death he did yeoman's service in senate and faculty and committee. It is by a code drawn up by his able and painstaking hand that the University is now governed. No pressure of his own class-work, or of the text-books that have made his name famous throughout the length and breadth of the land, ever caused him to turn a deaf ear when the call of the Trustees or of the Rector came to contribute to the common good of the institution for which he felt he could not do too much.

Of his greatest title to our regard I have not yet spoken. We who knew him shall remember best, and God, we trust, will reward most his constant, faithful devotion to the teachings and practices of our holy religion. A great lawyer, his first allegiance was to eternal justice. He was a scholar who saw God not only in science, but in daily life, and ever walked hand in hand with

Him. Here in this parish he was a common source of edification to priests and people. We of the University can bear witness to his attendance at daily Mass, his frequent Communions, his regular noon-day visits to his Lord in the Blessed Sacrament. Recalling his deep faith, his unaffected piety, his simplicity and honor and honesty, his unfailing charity, his evenness of temper, his serious reverence for sacred persons and holy things, his religious disregard for the vanities and trifles of life, we feel that here was one of those noble jurisconsults who mirror forth in their lives that justice which is the subject of their study, and whom Ulpian declared worthy to be called priests.

Surely, if death ever lay aside some of its gloom and terror, it is on such an occasion as the present. The grim visitor enters here not less as a friend than as a destroyer. It comes at the close of a long, honorable and well-spent life, and finds the body worn by age and not unwilling to lay down the burden of which it has become weary, though the mind be still vigorous and alert. It stills the eloquent tongue and halts the dexterous hand, but it cannot blot from public record the story of great hopes realized and great achievements done which will perpetuate the name and honor of him who sinks into the grave. It brings a great University to the bier of the departed to proclaim his high reputation as a scholar, his unquestioned integrity as a man, his unfaltering courage as a combatant in every contest for goodness and truth. It consoles his friends and acquaintances with the memory of an unblemished career. And if death must here break the sacred, tender bonds that bind parent to child, it at least speaks to the bereaved the sweet word of comfort—that he who has gone has left to his children the most precious of inheritances, a good name.

UNIVERSITY CHRONICLE.

The Sisters' College. With the permission of the Board of Trustees of the Catholic University an institute for the collegiate training of our teaching Sisters, to be known as The Sisters' College has been opened in connection with the University. In this institute the Sisters will follow courses leading to the degrees of the University. The instruction will be under the direction of the University but will be given apart from its regular courses and outside of the University grounds, for the present in the Convent of the Benedictine Nuns at Brookland. Several University professors have agreed to give their services as teachers in the new institute, which is modeled more or less closely on the St. Ann's Institute at Münster, in Prussia, carried on under the direction of the Prussian Episcopate, and so far quite successful.*

The college is open to all teaching Sisters sent by their superiors, and on the successful completion of its courses the University will grant the degrees lawfully earned by the students of the College. Credit for work of a collegiate character done elsewhere will be allowed, and examinations may be taken for advanced standing. The College will be conducted on the usual lines of the academic work of the University, of which it becomes an integral part, so that the graduates of the College are truly members of the University. The need of such an institute has long been keenly felt by our teaching Sisters, and they have freely importuned the University authorities to open to them, in some becoming way, the doors of this great central Catholic School. The Trustees of the University have finally agreed to permit the beginning of the good work in a modest way and with all due safeguards for the religious life of the Sisters. Twenty Sisters have already entered the College, 6 Sisters of Charity of the Blessed Virgin, Dubuque,

* *The Catholic University Bulletin*, May, 1908, p. 421.

Iowa, 3 Benedictine Sisters, Brookland, D. C., 2 Sisters of Jesus Mary, one from Quebec, Canada, and one from London, England, 2 Sisters of the Incarnate Word, San Antonio, Texas, 3 Sisters of Providence, St. Mary's of the Woods, Indiana, 2 Sisters of the Immaculate Heart, Scranton, Pa., 2 Sisters of St. Dominic, Sinsinawa, Wis., 3 Sisters of Divine Providence, Newport, Ky., 1 Sister of the Holy Humility of Mary, Cleveland, Ohio, 2 Sisters of Mercy, Chicago, Ill. The Sisters' College was regularly opened on October third with the Mass of the Holy Spirt and a pertinent discourse by the Right Reverend Rector of the University.

Formal Opening of the Sisters' College. The Sisters' College which opened on October 3 was solemnly inaugurated on Saturday, October 7, by His Excellency, the Most Rev. Diomede Falconio, Apostolic Delegate. The exercises took place in St. Benedict's Convent, Brookland, where the students of the College were assembled. His Excellency offered the Mass of the Holy Ghost, assisted by Very Rev. Dr. Thomas E. Shields, and Rev. Dr. William Turner as deacons. The Rt. Rev. Rector addressed the students and faculty on the significance of the occasion, and beautifully depicted the future usefulness of the new college in the cause of religion and Catholic education in this country. The choir of the Immaculate Conception College rendered the music, and many of the Dominican Fathers were present. The following members of the faculty of the Catholic University who are now conducting courses at the Sisters' College attended the ceremony: Very Rev. Dr. Edward A. Pace, Very Rev. Dr. Thomas E. Shields, Dr. George M. Bolling, Very Rev. Dr. John D. Maguire, Rev. Dr. William Turner, Dr. Aubrey E. Landry, Rev. Dr. Patrick J. McCormick, and Dr. Thomas C. Carrigan.

Meeting of the Board of Trustees. The Board of Trustees of the University held their semi-annual meeting in Divinity College on Monday, October 12. Four new members were elected, Most Reverend Edmond F. Prendergast, Archbishop

of Philadelphia, Most Reverend James J. Keane, Archbishop of Dubuque, Right Reverend J. F. Regis Canevin, Bishop of Pittsburg, and the Honorable Thomas Kearns. Reverend Dr. Franz Cöln was appointed Instructor in Sacred Scripture; Reverend John Fenlon, S. S. and Reverend Anthony Vieban, S. S., were appointed to the management of Divinity College and were given charge of the courses in pastoral and ascetical theology. The Board authorized the completion of the central portion of Gibbons Hall.

Farewell Dinner to Cardinal Falconio. On Thursday evening, November 9, His Eminence Diomede Cardinal Falconio was the guest of honor at a dinner given by the University in Divinity College, and bade farewell to the assembled professors, students and representatives of the affiliated Colleges.

His Eminence is accompanied to Rome by the Right Reverend Rector, whom he has invited to assist at the consistory in which His Eminence and Cardinals Farley and O'Connell are to be elevated to the dignity of the Cardinalate.

Gift of Fifty Thousand Dollars. The magnificent gift of Fifty Thousand Dollars was presented recently by Sir James J. Ryan of Philadelphia, Knight of the Order of St. Gregory. The gift was made during a visit paid to His Eminence the Chancellor of the University. The generous donor was accompanied by Monsignor Maurice Hassett of Harrisburg, alumnus and former Instructor at the University.

Formal opening of the Year 1911-1912. The formal opening of the present academic year at the Catholic University took place on Sunday, October 8. Solemn Mass of the Holy Ghost was celebrated by the Rt. Rev. Rector in the Assembly Room, McMahon Hall, at 10.30 o'clock. He was assisted by the Rev. T. A. Ryder, C. S. P., deacon, Rev. H. A. Swift, C. S. P. sub-deacon, and Mr. J. C. Allard, master of ceremonies.

The entire faculty, dressed in academic robes, and the student body, now the largest in the history of the University,

attended the ceremony. The Rt. Rev. Rector made many important announcements of changes in the faculty for the new year, and afterward delivered an inspiring address on the "Academic Virtues."

Public Lectures. The following is the list of Public Lectures for the Fall Course, 1911:

October 19—"Addison and the English Essay."
PATRICK J. LENNOX, B. A.
October 26—"Calderón and Spanish Drama."
REV. DR. CHARLES WARREN CURRIER.
November 3—"Beowulf, The Anglo-Saxon Epic."
FRANCIS J. HEMELT, A. B.
November 9—"Marcus Tullius Cicero."
REV. DR. JOHN DAMEN MAGUIRE.
November 16—"Aristophanes and Greek Political Comedy."
DR. GEORGE MELVILLE BOLLING.
November 23—"Eusebius of Cæsarea, Father of Church History."
V. REV. DR. PATRICK J. HEALY.
December 7—"St. Augustine of Hippo."
REV. DR. WILLIAM TURNER.
December 14—"Pascal as Christian Apologist."
REV. DR. GEORGE M. SAUVAGE, C. S. C.

The retirement of Mgr. Grannan from the active teaching staff of the University terminates a long career in Catholic educational work in the United States. Monsignor Grannan will devote himself hereafter to the management of the Henry McCadden Junior Fund for the education of young men to the priesthood in poorer dioceses of the United States and elsewhere. He has, however, also been entrusted with certain work in the interests of the Pontifical College, Pio Latino Americano.

Monsignor Grannan entered the Propaganda College in Rome in 1871. He was ordained in 1878, having taken the Doctor's degree in Philosophy and Theology at the Propaganda. He was Professor in the Theological Faculty of Mt. St. Mary's College, Emmitsburg, Md., for eight years. After that term of service he went to Europe where he studied for two years in Berlin and Paris, preparing for his work as Professor of

Scripture in the Catholic University of America. He taught in the University continuously for twenty years, from 1891 to the present year. He was Vice-Rector of the Catholic University for one year. During his term in Mt. St. Mary's College he was acting President for one year. He was one of the original twelve members of the Pontifical Biblical Commission. His appointment as Domestic Prelate to His Holiness last April terminates thus with fitting recognition an unusually long career in the work of Catholic education.